

**COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO AUGUST 2007 OUTBREAK OF EQUINE  
INFLUENZA**

before

**THE HON IAN CALLINAN AC**

A submission from  
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## **APPOINTMENT AND TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EQUINE INFLUENZA EMERGENCY**

In an announcement on 25 September 2007, the Honourable Peter McGauran (Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry) appointed the Honourable Ian Callinan as Commissioner to conduct a Commission of Inquiry under the following terms of reference and instructions:

*Specifically, Mr. Callinan's terms of reference are to inquire into and report with respect to:*

*(a) the circumstances that have contributed to the outbreak of equine influenza in Australia; and*

*(b) the need for any strengthened biosecurity procedures for quarantine management of imported horses.*

*As he deems necessary during the course of the Commission of Inquiry, Mr. Callinan may also inquire into such other matters incidental to those stated above as might assist me in considering his report.*

**In his opening address, Counsel Assisting the Commissioner, Mr. Tom Meagher, made the following observations about the terms of reference and lines of inquiry before the Commission:**

At Transcript Pages 5 – 7: 3/10/07

*“There are two things that I wish to emphasise at this early stage with respect to our terms of reference.*

*The first is that they are confined to the circumstances contributing to the outbreak of equine influenza. They do not call for or require a general inquiry into the spread of the virus. In the circumstances as currently known, it is likely that you will have to seek to identify the cause of the infection of horses which attended the Carroll's Ranch event, but that you will not be required to consider the spread of the disease beyond horses that attended that event.*

*The second matter I wish to emphasise is that whilst your terms of reference require an investigation of the procedures which were or should have been in place to prevent an outbreak and whether any such procedures were followed, they do not require or call for inquiry as to the liability or fault of any person in any legal sense with respect to the outbreak, nor do they require or call for any consideration of any entitlement to compensation or damage as a result of the many and serious and continuing consequences of the outbreak on the Australian horse industry generally.*

*You are required to report to the Minister no later than 25 April next year. As the summary which I am about to give will show, there is a necessarily intensive investigation which must be undertaken before the Inquiry is in a position to commence public hearings. Your Inquiry will most economically and efficiently be conducted when the results of those investigations and the relevant documents have been collated and analysed. It is presently proposed that the principal evidence of witnesses will be reduced to writing and that not all witnesses will be presented for cross-examination. Currently, in excess of 100 persons have been identified as potential witnesses and interviewed by officers of the Quarantine Service Compliance and Investigation Group. Those officers are working or will, under an arrangement which is currently being made, work under your direction in accordance with your arrangements contemplated by section 66AZ (1) (b) of the Quarantine Act.*

*The matters which require further investigation include the following - and I'll list them briefly:*

*(a) The circumstances and events with respect to the horses in the six consignments from the commencement of pre-entry quarantine to the confirmation of the presence of equine influenza at Eastern Creek in late August;*

*(b) the movement of persons and equipment who or which may have had contact with those horses from their arrival into Australia until the conduct of the event at Maitland on the weekend of 18 and 19 August;*

*(c) the procedures, if any, which were in place at various points in relation to the importation and quarantine of those horses and whether those procedures were implemented and their implementation audited;*

*(d) the analysis of samples taken from the horses to identify, if possible, what is referred to as the index case, which is the first horse in Australia to have contracted the virus;*

*(e) an analysis of the Australian isolates of the virus to enable comparison of those isolates with those currently circulating strains of the virus in the countries of origin of the imported horses and specifically those currently circulating in Ireland and Japan. That work requires the assistance of various local and overseas authorities and laboratories, including the Animal Health Trust Laboratory at Newmarket in the United Kingdom, which is the leading reference laboratory for equine influenza in the world.*

*These last two matters in particular require careful and time-consuming testing and analysis, which must be undertaken.*

*Finally, it will be necessary to investigate the measures currently adopted for the prevention of the importation of infected horses and whether any improved or different measures can and should be adopted.”*

At Transcript pages 11 – 12:

*“Investigation to this point in time has revealed a number of issues with respect to the period of pre-entry quarantine, the arrival of horses in Sydney and their loading onto transport for carriage to Eastern Creek. They include the following issues:*

*first, the pre-entry quarantine procedures and whether pre-entry quarantine, which has been conducted at a number of different locations in the various countries of origin, effectively isolated the horses from the risk of disease during that period. In some cases, the quarantine was served at satellite farms of Coolmore Stud in Ireland under supervision of the Irish Department of Agriculture, and that supervision appears to have been ad hoc.*

*The next issue is whether each of the horses was effectively vaccinated against equine influenza, as was certified to be the case, and there is an issue about that.*

*The next is whether there were any current and documented AQIS procedures detailing what was to happen from the point of arrival of the horses to the time of their arrival at Eastern Creek, and again there are clearly going to be issues about the existence and implementation of such procedures.*

*The next is whether the apparently required documentations and certificates were produced for each of the horses, and again there are questions about that.*

*Next, there are issues as to whether unauthorised or unnecessary persons were present during the unloading and transfer of the horses to the trucks and whether any of those persons came into contact with the horses.*

*The next issue is whether the persons present and handling the horses wore any or sufficient protective clothing and subsequently took any or any adequate decontamination measures.*

*There are also issues as to the subsequent movements of the persons present or having contact with the horses and the subsequent movements of any equipment which came into contact with the horses during the course of their unloading.*

*Finally, in relation to this aspect of the inquiry, there are issues as to whether the hay and other food products from the air stalls and the waste from the horses in the air stalls and at the airport were safely disposed of.”*

At Transcript pages 13 – 14

*“As is plain, there are a number of issues to be investigated in relation to the activities at the quarantine station. They include whether the grooms and others having contact with the horses undertook any adequate biosecurity practices before leaving and when entering the equine enclosure. They include whether protective clothing was worn by private vets and others attending to the horses in the equine enclosure and whether they carried out any decontamination procedures before leaving Eastern Creek.*

*There also do not appear to be any reliable records kept of access of persons into and out of the equine enclosure. Finally, there are issues as to whether there was any documented and current work instruction as to biosecurity measures which was adopted within the station in the sense that it was being complied with and enforced.”*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The Australian Horse Industry Council Inc. (AHIC) is particularly well suited to provide comment to assist the Commissioner in his deliberations. AHIC has been the national organisation representing the horse industry for almost 25 years. Moves to establish a national horse organisation began in the late 1970's and eventually the Australian Horse Council was formed in 1984. This evolved into AHIC in 1997.

Since its inception, AHIC (and its predecessor) have been intimately involved in matters related to health, disease and quarantine issues for the Australian national horse industry. This has taken the form of participation in various meetings and forums and production of reports and recommendations to both Commonwealth and State levels of government, and to industry.

There has been a considerable volume of correspondence over the years between AHIC and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) on a wide range of issues. Many of these issues have been highlighted during the first round of hearings of this Commission up to December 2007.

The background and qualifications of the AHIC Board and Convenor of the AHIC Health and Quarantine Committee (Dr. Patricia Ellis) are in Appendix 1.

## ISSUES RELATED TO EMERGENCY DISEASES, AQIS AND QUARANTINE OF HORSES

In taking submissions and oral evidence during the investigation of these matters, the Commission has discovered during its first round of hearings a number of areas of concern related to quarantine for horses imported into Australia.

These specific issues are:

1. Lack of clarity in areas of responsibility within AQIS
2. Imprecise lines of communication between various levels of management within AQIS
3. Concentration on writing of portfolio business statements, business plans, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and work orders (WOs) rather than implementing quarantine
4. Failure to make various SOPs and WOs readily available to staff
5. Failure to audit implementation of these various plans and procedures
6. Apparent lack of understanding of powers and responsibilities under the *Quarantine Act 1908*
7. Appointment of senior level personnel with no training, experience or knowledge of animal diseases
8. Lack of appreciation of the true risks to the Australian horse industry of an incursion of Equine Influenza (EI)
9. Failure to induct personnel in quarantine about biosecurity procedures
10. Failure to supervise personnel entering and leaving quarantine areas
11. Failure to learn from overseas experiences with EI incursions
12. Failure to keep track of EI outbreaks in other countries
13. Failure to monitor quarantine of horses before import to Australia
14. Failure to implement adequate testing of horses while in quarantine
15. Placing blind faith in certification as a quarantine barrier
16. Apparent deliberate under resourcing of quarantine stations because they had been sold and leases had only a few years to run
17. Downgrading of qualified veterinary manpower within AQIS and replacement with less qualified and experienced personnel
18. Failure to charge commercially relevant rates for horses in quarantine
19. Taking all steps possible to shift areas of responsibility outside AQIS, even to unqualified personnel not employed by AQIS thus creating potential conflicts of interest
20. A lack of understanding of public service obligations
21. A lack of sensitivity to dealing with outside clients, no customer service culture
22. Failure to listen to feedback from front line staff
23. Failure by senior levels of management to provide support for front line staff
24. Failure to listen to feedback from clients and the horse industry

All these factors are symptomatic of the fundamental issue underlying the very visible EI emergency.

That issue is an inappropriate organizational culture within AQIS that inevitably failed when put to the test.

The situation that developed in August 2007 was the culmination of the "...when not if..." guessing game about when there would be a major emergency animal disease incursion into Australia.

It seems that over many years there has developed within AQIS a mindset of actively searching for all ways possible to deflect areas of what should be AQIS responsibilities to other parties. It seems that senior management takes little responsibility for areas that they are supposed to supervise. Too often we have heard "...that's not in my area of responsibility..." during the first round of hearings. Just who is responsible is often in the eye of the beholder at any particular point in time. This provides no comfort to industries which need to interact with AQIS in their normal course of business.

At Transcript page 206 line 36 there are some comments on the Hazard Analysis (or Assessment) and Critical Control Point (HACCP) method of risk assessment system. This has been used as a basis for development of the quarantine protocols at the Sandown quarantine station run by Racing Victoria Limited. The replies from AQIS management did not seem all that receptive to the HACCP process because they were initially used in the food industry. Nevertheless, these methods are regarded as useful in development of biosecurity protocols in other livestock industries (see for example Suggested outline of potential critical control point points for biosecurity and biocontainment on large dairy farms by Aurora Villareal, David A. Dargatz, V. Michael Lane, Brian J, McCluskey and Mo D Salman in *Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association* March 2007 pages 808 to 819).

## **ISSUES RELATED TO THE HORSE INDUSTRY AND EMERGENCY DISEASES**

While there have been several issues related to quarantine and quarantine supervision identified as potentially contributing to the escape of EI into the Australian horse herd, other factors are of real concern. These relate to practices within the international and Australian horse industries.

There is a multitude of reasons for the Australian horse industry to reduce the impact of both endemic and exotic diseases. These include reduced costs of production of horses, reduced costs of upkeep of horses, reduced impact on ability of horses to compete in events, increased social amenity by allowing horse owners to undertake recreational activities, increased competitiveness for

Australian horses in international markets, reduced quarantine requirements for Australian horses travelling interstate and overseas, and for some diseases a reduced zoonotic potential.

The Australian horse industry has specific obligations under the *Government and Livestock Industry Cost Sharing Deed in respect of Emergency Animal Disease Responses* (otherwise known as the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement, or EADRA). These are outlined in Paragraph 14 Biosecurity of EADRA at page 20:

“14. Biosecurity

- (a) The Parties acknowledge the need for a program of risk reduction measures, complementary to the Deed, to reduce the risk of the entry and spread of EADs including biosecurity measures for implementation and maintenance at national, regional and individual premises levels.”

These contractual obligations are in addition to disease reporting obligations under the various jurisdictional Stock Disease Control Acts.

**NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH PERFORMANCE STANDARDS VERSION 3 AND THE AUSTRALIAN HORSE INDUSTRY**

The Australian Animal Health Council Limited (trading as Animal Health Australia or AHA) is charged with a number of responsibilities under EADRA. One of these is to assist members in improving the capability and performance of the national animal health system. To this end there has been development and implementation of National Animal Health Performance Standards (NAHPS) “...as a means of assessing national capability, driving improvements in performance and ensuring that available resources are deployed to address matters of greatest risk or opportunity.” NAHPS is assessed against 6 core functions of:

1. Consumer Protection
2. Trade and Market Access
3. Disease surveillance
4. Endemic disease management
5. Emergency preparedness and response
6. Livestock Welfare

Each of the core functions is assessed against 9 core capabilities:

1. Policy Development
2. Management
3. Service Capability/Capacity
4. Information management
5. Livestock Tracing
6. Training

7. Communication
8. Research and Development
9. Legislation and Regulation

In the 2006 NAHPS assessment, AHIC flagged the following factors as high risk to the national horse industry (not in any order):

1. Poor on-farm biosecurity
2. Significant disease events not reported
3. Inadequate biosecurity education, awareness and management at all levels;
  - livestock industries and commercial producers
  - non-commercial producers
  - community

All these were operative during the current EI emergency. It took several days for industry to be notified that there was a problem inside Eastern Creek Quarantine Station. There were further delays in notification to industry about the possibility that EI was in the general Australian horse population.

In the same assessment in 2006, AHIC identified the following factors in NAHPS thought to represent a medium risk to the national horse industry (again not in particular any order):

1. Major incident due to natural EAD outbreak, bio-terrorism, economic terrorism
2. Breakdown of national animal health coalition – Commonwealth and States pursue different priorities; States focus on local issues; Government and industry partnership breaks down
3. Failure of EAD reporting and management arrangements – Failure of passive surveillance systems
4. Intra- and Cross-Government Agency Responsibilities not followed through
5. Incursion of disease due to failure of – quarantine; surveillance
6. Reduced resourcing of animal health
7. Lack of communication strategy that provides a coordinated approach to media management (pre and post outbreak)
8. Poor perception of Animal Welfare Practices in the Horse Industry
9. Intra-Agency and Cross-Agency Responsibilities are ineffective or inactive
10. Consumer Protection measures to ensure Public Confidence in the Horse Industry
11. Politically expedient decisions which impact on trade and market access, result in trade retaliation, impact on EAD response management
12. Increasing requirement – over-requirement of surveillance and testing to prove animal health status

13. Non-mainstream production systems (the “back yard chooks”) – outside the major disease monitoring and reporting programs
14. Disease surveillance in Native, Feral and Companion Animal Populations
15. No national identification system for horses
16. R & D programs across the horse industry currently poorly coordinated.

Again, many of these factors have been apparent during the EI emergency in 2007 and 2008.

### **ATTITUDES TO BIOSECURITY ON AUSTRALIAN HORSE FARMS**

In March 2007, Animal Health Australia released the findings of a study into biosecurity practices on Australian farms; including horse farms (see On-farm Biosecurity/Disease Risk Mitigation Awareness and Information Needs of Livestock Producers Market Research Report. Quantum Market Research (Aust) Pty. Ltd. South Yarra, Australia).

*“Bringing biosecurity to the fore and instilling the right attitudes and entrenching the right daily behaviours in producers is the core challenge going forward”* was one of the conclusions of this study (see page 15).

The study found that 48% of horse breeders claimed to know little about biosecurity (page 27), 21% of horse producers never thought about biosecurity at all (page 34), and only 38% thought about biosecurity more than once per month (page 34). Only 41% of horse producers indicated that biosecurity was part of their normal business, and 29% indicated that biosecurity was either only a small part or no part at all of their normal business practices (page 37). Only 35% of horse producers isolated, observed or quarantined new introductions on their properties (page 41). Only 30% of horse producers regularly inspected their horses, and only 1% controlled visitor movements on their properties (page 41), but 39% indicated that visitor access was already restricted (page 70). When horses left a home property and returned, only 14% quarantined these horses upon return home, and 16% separated the returning horses from other animals (page 50). In this study, 65% of horse producers were interested in receiving information on disease types and symptoms, how to reduce or prevent disease, and how to identify risks of disease, but only 7% were interested in finding out how to implement biosecurity procedures (page 57). Only 50% of horse producers were very likely or likely to implement a new livestock inspection practice that did not cost much and took only 1 hour per week, and 47% were not very likely or not at all likely to introduce such a procedure (page 64). Interestingly 69% of horse producers were very likely or quite likely to attend a biosecurity training course (page 73), but 74% were not very likely or not at all likely to attend such a course if it cost \$200 (page 79).

The results from this study indicate there is plenty of room for improvement in the knowledge of Australian horse owners about all issues related to biosecurity.

Biosecurity and associated risks have been widely discussed in international literature over the past few years (see for example Veterinary expertise in biosecurity and biological risk assessment by James G.W. Wenzel and Kenneth E. Nusbaum, in *Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association* May 15, 2007, pages 1476 to 1480). The Appendix in this paper (at page 1479) lists 9 areas to concentrate on in formulating biosecurity plans:

1. Develop a plan for each farm unit
2. Enhance perimeter security
3. Establish a visitor approval process
4. Improve biosecurity practices of farm personnel
5. Control animal movement
6. Ensure safety of feed and water
7. Control vehicle movement
8. Enhance manure management
9. Protect human health

None of these is especially difficult to implement with a little effort and forethought. The main issue preventing widespread uptake of the biosecurity message has been attitudes in the horse industry to biosecurity, as outlined in the Animal Health Australia study. The current emergency response to the EI incursion has brought home to the wider horse industry the importance of on-farm biosecurity procedures. It is critical that the lessons of the current situation are not lost on the horse industry into the future.

Desk-top exercises to enable the Australian horse industry to prepare for an emergency disease outbreak have been undertaken. The reports from these are:

Horse Alert Victoria, available at

[http://www1.racingvictoria.net.au/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=311&Itemid=228](http://www1.racingvictoria.net.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=311&Itemid=228)

Horse Alert South Australia available at:

[http://www.horsesa.asn.au/zdocument/file/33/horse\\_alert\\_press\\_16\\_11\\_04.pdf](http://www.horsesa.asn.au/zdocument/file/33/horse_alert_press_16_11_04.pdf)

and Exercise Pegasus (September 2006).

## **MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE INTERNATIONAL HORSE INDUSTRY THAT POTENTIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO SPREAD OF DISEASE**

It has long been acknowledged that the increase in international movement of horses over the past 20 years or so has increased the likelihood that horse

diseases will become more widespread. Horses now move by rapid modern air transport over very long distances within hours. The degree of comfort and assurance that came from prolonged sea voyages as a barrier to disease transmission no longer applies. This factor makes appropriate duration of pre-export and post-arrival quarantine periods of much greater importance than ever.

The Australian horse herd is particularly at risk from introduction of exotic diseases by international transport of horses. There are few of the major infectious diseases of horses in Australia and so horses that originate from or travel through overseas countries present particular risks. The risk to the Australian horse herd from exotic diseases is always high because of the devastating consequences that can arise, no matter what the likelihood of a disease incursion might be. Management practices that in any way increase the likelihood of introduction of an exotic disease are of particular concern.

This problem for the Australian horse herd is made all the more relevant because of the persistent refusal of the international Thoroughbred industry to embrace and allow use of artificial breeding techniques. Such techniques are well established in all other horse breeds, and in all other livestock industries. Reports of the use of artificial breeding techniques in horses sometimes find their way into the popular press (see *Horsing around with IVF*, *Herald-Sun*, Monday January 14, 2008, page 16). Thus news about these techniques is not hidden away in obscure scientific literature that ordinary horse owners cannot access.

Introduction of artificial breeding techniques would immediately reduce the need for the high risk international transport of shuttle stallions, thus reducing the chances of international spread of infectious horse diseases. Introduction of artificial breeding techniques would provide increased business opportunities for stallion and brood mare owners because they could ship semen or embryos to any country, rather than have breeding opportunities restricted to the immediate surrounds of the stud farm of residence of the horses at a particular time of the year. Both Thoroughbred stallions and mares are used in artificial breeding techniques by cross-breeding with horses of other breeds, and so the technique is a viable option. Artificial breeding of horses in Australia has been practised for many years and so there is plenty of experience within Australia to assist the Thoroughbred industry in this area of horse management. Participants in the Thoroughbred breeding industry must be allowed the choice of using either natural or artificial breeding techniques. Thoroughbred horses produced from use of artificial breeding techniques must not be discriminated against by either the breeding or racing sectors of the Thoroughbred industry.

Other horse industry factors that increase likelihood of an exotic disease incursion and spread in Australia include:

- Sourcing horses from areas where exotic diseases are known to be endemic

- Sourcing horses from countries where many diseases are not notifiable, so it is impossible to predict whether a particular disease is active or not
- Travelling horses through countries that have diseases exotic to Australia
- Mixing shipments of horses from areas of different origin and therefore not of uniform health status (either before or after entry to Australia)
- Rapid air transport to Australia
- Management practices that allow horses from different origins to congregate and mix on a property
- Management practices which dictate that horses be transported from a home property to mix with other horses, and then return to the home property
- Failure to implement and enforce separation of horses of different health status on a particular property
- Improperly applied vaccination programmes that do not result in the development of protective immunity in a sufficient number of horses to prevent disease spread or recrudescence
- Improper application or interpretation of diagnostic tests for horse diseases
- Lack of a sufficiently robust test for particular horse diseases (problems with sensitivity and specificity)
- Lack of any test at all for a disease
- Failure to recognise a new horse disease before it spreads regionally, nationally, or internationally
- Failure by horse owners to have biosecurity as an important part of their routine horse management.

### **IMBALANCE IN THE RISK-REWARD EQUATION FOR SHUTTLE STALLIONS**

Another factor that is critical to the consequences of the current EI emergency is the timing of the importation of shuttle stallions into Australia. They arrive at the end of winter or early spring – just when the most active time for the entire horse industry is beginning.

This is the time of horse breeding (horses are seasonal breeders only during spring and summer), the horse event circuit gets under way, many agricultural shows present horse events, the spring racing carnival for Thoroughbreds and a bit later for Standardbreds is eagerly awaited, and other commercial horse-related activities are scheduled for this time of year. It is a time when the majority of economic activity happens in the entire horse industry.

While it might be convenient for some horse breeders to bring in shuttle stallions for the southern hemisphere breeding season and for them to reap the economic benefits, the rest of the horse industry is subjected to risks they cannot control. The rest of the horse industry enjoys none of the economic rewards that flow to the shuttle stallion owners. Thus there is a significant imbalance in the risk-

reward equation surrounding the importation of shuttle stallions, which are mainly Thoroughbreds and a few Standardbreds. There is limited activity in shuttle stallions in other horse breeds.

This risk imbalance would be eliminated if artificial breeding techniques were substituted for this high risk activity. The down side risks of disease incursion would be largely limited to those breeders engaged in importing horse semen or embryos, and the remainder of the horse industry would be able to continue its normal activities.

Importation of these shuttle stallions is also of importance from a geographic standpoint. Breeding of horses mostly takes place in areas of Australia which have the highest densities of the entire horse population. Thus any infectious disease that is brought into Australia in a shipment of shuttle stallions is highly likely to be carried into these areas of high horse populations, thus increasing the chances for spread and establishment of the disease. A direct result of this is that there will be an increased impact across the entire horse industry from such an occurrence. This is just another reason that continuation of the shuttle stallion program represents a very high risk problem to the Australian horse herd.

Changes in management of breeding in Thoroughbred stallions over the past 20 years or so are outlined in the paper Mounting expectations for Thoroughbred stallions by Regina M. Turner and Sue. M. McDonnell in *Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association* May 15 2007, pages 1458 to 1460.

Similar changes to the management of Thoroughbred stallions have taken place in Australia over the same period as described in North America (see Australian Racing Fact Book 2005 / 06, pages 27 to 29, published by Australian Racing Board Limited, Level 7, 51 Druitt Street, Sydney NSW 2000 Australia). There are fewer stallions breeding larger numbers of mares potentially leading to a further reduction in genetic diversity within Thoroughbreds. Economic and marketing factors are thought to be the major reason for this change with buyers logically favouring only those genetic lines thought to provide a better chance of producing a winner. Increased costs of maintaining horses also leads to buyers steering clear of genetics perceived to be less desirable.

## **ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN QUARANTINE AND INSPECTION SERVICE**

AQIS is a large organisation with about 3000 staff, and about 2200 of them are in quarantine. Evidence given to the Commission is that AQIS operates under a "matrix management system" (Transcript page 111, line 1).

A matrix organisation is one where there is no traditional single boss, rather a person reports to multiple persons in more senior positions. Matrix structures are said to provide flexibility and balanced decision making at the expense of

complexity. Matrix-based systems went out of favour in the late 1970's. For more than 30 years matrix management systems have been recognised as susceptible to a number of problems (see Problems of Matrix Organizations, Stanley M. Davis and Paul R. Lawrence, *Harvard Business Review* May-June 1978, pp131 – 139). These nine potential issues are:

1. *Tendencies toward anarchy* – a formless state of confusion where people do not recognise a “boss” to whom they feel responsible.  
The authors state that “Organizations should not rely too much on an informal or latent matrix to coordinate critical tasks. Relationships between functional and product managers should be explicit so that people are in approximate agreement about who is to do what under various circumstances. Properly used, a matrix does not leave such matters in an indefinite status; it is a definite structure and not a “free form” organization.”
2. *Power struggles* – managers jockey for power in many organisations, but a matrix design almost encourages them to do so
3. *Severe groupitis* – the mistaken belief that matrix management is the same as group decision making.  
The authors advise “Top managers need to accompany their strategic choice to move towards a matrix with a serious educational effort to clarify to all participants what a matrix is and what it is not.”
4. *Collapse during economic crunch* – when business declines, the matrix becomes the scapegoat for poor management and is discarded.  
Apparently this requires prevention rather than cure. “Top management can prevent this kind of collapse of the matrix by employing general managerial excellence, independent of the matrix, long before the crunch arrives. Good planning, for example, can often forecast downturns in the economic cycle. Corporate structures such as the matrix should not have to change because of standard changes in the business cycle. When management planning has been poor, however, the matrix is a readily available scapegoat.”
5. *Excessive overhead* – the fear of high costs associated with a matrix
6. *Sinking to lower levels* – the matrix has some difficulty in staying alive at high levels of a corporation, and a corresponding tendency to sink to group and division levels where it thrives
7. *Uncontrolled layering* – matrices which lie within matrices which lie within matrices result frequently from the dynamics of power rather than from the logic of design  
“...layering is a pathology only if the matrix begins to metastasize. When this occurs, organization charts begin to resemble blueprints for a complex electronic machine, relationships become unnecessarily complex, and the matrix form may become more of a burden than it is worth.”  
“....The best remedies for uncontrolled layering are careful task analysis and reduced power struggles.....”

Matrix design is complex enough without the addition of power struggles. A well-conceptualized matrix is bound to be less complex and easier to manage than one that is illogically organized.”

8. *Navel gazing* – managers in a matrix can succumb to excessive internal preoccupation and loose touch with the market place.  
“Because a matrix fosters considerable interdependence of people and tasks and demands negotiating skills on the part of its members, matrix managers sometimes tend to get absorbed in internal relations at the expense of paying attention to the world outside the organization. When this happens, an organization spends more energy ironing out its own disputes than in serving its customers. The outward focus disappears because the short-term demands of daily working life have yet to be worked through.”
9. *Decision strangulation* – too much democracy, not enough action.  
This leads to too much internal consultation before a final decision is reached, thus delaying useful action. There can be a reluctance to make decisions at all by constantly referring issues up or down the chains of command, and this can happen at various parts of the different layers in a matrix. Persons who want to be decisive and take action can become frustrated in a matrix because of the necessary consultation within a matrix structure induced by the different reporting that needs to be undertaken.

While these “pathologies” have been recognised in commercial organisations, it appears that at least some have beset AQIS over the years, and there appears to be no evidence that any efforts have been made to correct these issues.

The key to a successful matrix organisation and management is the mind set of the persons within the organisation (see *Matrix Management: Not a Structure, a Frame of Mind*. Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal. *Harvard Business Review*. July – August 1990, pp 138 – 145). Here the problem is identified as one that entities are incapable of carrying out strategies that they have developed. There are problems created by attempting to implement simplistic solutions to complex problems. This is compounded if increasingly complex organizational structures are developed in an attempt to deal with complex situations.

The authors state: “In practice, however, the matrix proved all but unmanageable – especially in an international context. Dual reporting led to conflict and confusion; the proliferation of channels created informational logjams as a proliferation of committees and reports bogged down the organization; overlapping responsibilities produced turf battles and a loss of accountability. Separated by barriers of distance, language, time, and culture, managers found it virtually impossible to clarify the confusion and resolve conflicts.”

And further: “ The critical strategic requirement is not to devise the most ingenious and well coordinated plan but to build the most viable and flexible

strategic process; the key organizational task is not to design the most elegant structure but to capture individual capabilities and motivate the entire organization to respond cooperatively to a complicated and dynamic environment.”

The key to overcoming these complexities is to develop appropriate attitudes and skills in personnel, rather than imposing organizational structures. It is necessary first to install appropriate broad corporate beliefs and norms that permeate the organisation. There needs to be clarification of communication and decision-making processes reinforced by fostering relationships that allow these to happen as a matter of course. There are three fundamental principles to follow:

1. Develop and communicate a clear and consistent vision
2. Development of effective human resource management processes to broaden individual perspectives and develop identification with organizational goals
3. Integration of individual thinking and activities into the broad corporate agenda – create an “all inclusive” environment within the organisation.

Values and vision need to be dispersed with “.. clarity of expression that makes company objectives understandable and meaningful; continuity of purpose that underscores their enduring importance; and consistency of application across business units and geographical boundaries that ensures uniformity throughout the organisation.”

In a large complex organisation such as AQIS, staffed by highly qualified specialists, it is not uncommon for there not to be a shared vision or set of values. It is the responsibility of top management to ensure that these individuals see the relevance of their skills and expertise to the overall objectives of servicing the Commonwealth and the Australian public in quarantine. Top management must ensure the clarity, continuity and consistency of AQIS values and vision are well understood by the entire organisation, and are reinforced regularly so there is due regard to the vital role that AQIS plays for Australia. This is not helped by the constant shifting of individuals into different roles within AQIS on a regular basis. Furthermore, lack of a consistent induction and training process, and lack of access to documentation cannot produce clarity in the roles of AQIS staff.

“The inbuilt conflict in a matrix structure pulls managers in several different directions at once. Developing a matrix of flexible perspectives and relationships within each manager’s mind, however, achieves an entirely different result. It lets individuals make the judgements and negotiates the trade-offs that drive the organization toward a shared strategic objective.”

## **AHIC RECORDS AND ISSUES RAISED DURING THE COMMISSION HEARINGS TO DECEMBER 2007**

Up to December 2007 The Commission has taken oral and written evidence in relation to the introduction of EI to Australia and the spread of EI to the horse event at Maitland. During its hearings The Commission has identified many related issues which have been of concern to AHIC for many years. A search of incomplete correspondence held by AHIC since 1989 reveals that the following issues have been identified over many years, but are yet to be resolved:

### **1. Equine Influenza in overseas countries and lessons for Australia**

1989 Australian Horse Council October-December Newsletter  
Re the July 1989 outbreak of Equine Influenza in Europe:

*“...The first case was ... in a regularly vaccinated group of the ceremonial horses of the Kings Troop.....not characterised by typical explosive spread of coughing and fever.....presented with mild respiratory symptoms only.*

*A significant feature of this outbreak has been the occurrence of mild disease or symptom-less seroconversion in vaccinated horses. It became apparent that in many instances vaccines had been administered to satisfy mandatory programmes for competition rather than for optimum immunity, and that to maintain complete protection against influenza, vaccines needed to be administered as frequently as every 4 months.*

*Australian import protocols for all countries were amended before the current UK outbreak to require vaccination within the 4 months prior to importation and the 14 day post arrival quarantine period for all horses (except those imported from New Zealand) provides a satisfactory buffer period to counter introduction of influenza to Australia.....”*

30 May 1990

Letter from Peter Huntington (Convenor, Australian Equine Diseases Liaison Committee) to Australian Horse Council:

*“.....Control and eradication would not involve destruction of horses but small numbers of foals would die. A widespread outbreak would lead to cessation of racing for 5 – 12 weeks...”*

8 February 1992

Article in The Veterinary Record page 126 by J. Wood and Dr. J. Mumford “Epidemiology of equine influenza”:

*“It has become clear that a change in the epidemiology of equine influenza in the UK has occurred. Moreover, in vaccinated horses, the clinical presentation of the disease may be radically different to that which was previously considered pathognomonic.*

*Before and during the 1979, epidemics of equine influenza sporadically swept over the UK. Affected animals typically had rapid onset high rectal temperatures (>104 F, 40 C, and a hacking dry cough. In addition there was a non-specific malaise with often heavy muco-purulent nasal discharges. One feature that was almost unique to influenza was the high proportion of animals affected at one time.....*

*Since the 1989 epidemic, there has been evidence of continuous influenza activity in the UK, with peaks in July and August, and December. These peaks are associated with the flat and National Hunt racing calendars, and the movement of young horses, although it is not entirely clear why this persistence has occurred.*

*.....*

*When influenza occurs in vaccinated horses, the duration and severity of clinical signs are significantly reduced, and recovery is usually rapid and uneventful, especially if horses are rested in the acute stage. It is now extremely difficult to make diagnoses on clinical grounds alone in vaccinated animals. For example, in one recent outbreak the predominant sign was hindlimb oedema with only a few raised temperatures and it was not possible to distinguish on clinical grounds the disease from that caused by either equine herpesvirus or equine arteritis virus. The salient feature that still distinguishes influenza from most other respiratory diseases is the high proportion of in-contact animals that show some signs.....”*

30 November 1992

AHC press release about an outbreak of respiratory disease in Hong Kong:

*“.....these scenarios pale into insignificance if the Hong Kong virus hits Australia with the same intensity.....The social and economic effects will rival the bank disasters of recent years.*

*In just 8 weeks:-*

- the racing industry would lose \$1.5 billion in revenue*
- the jobs of over 250,000 industry employees will be thrown into jeopardy*
- State Governments will lose over \$100 million dollars in turnover taxes.*

*...It also re-inforces the need for optimum exotic disease awareness and preparedness in relation to horse diseases.”*

2 December 1992

Letter and fax from Kevin Doyle (Senior Assistant Director Animal Quarantine and Exports Branch, AQIS) about the Hong Kong equine influenza type 2 outbreak.

2 December 1992

Hand written letter from Kevin Dunn (Chief Quarantine Officer Animals and CVO QLD) emphasizing the importance of spread from infected horses and by contaminated objects.

22 December 1992

Press release about the outbreak of Equine Influenza that closed racing in Hong Kong, noting the disease entered Hong Kong despite a quarantine barrier and prior vaccination infecting 400 of 958 horses. Also noting potential effects on the Australian horse industry of a similar outbreak

30 December 1992

Australian Horse Council letter to Hon. Simon Crean (Minister for Primary Industries and Energy) emphasizing the potential effects of an Equine Influenza outbreak (after the Hong Kong outbreak)

*“.....The problem with equine influenza is not one of compensation for destruction of animals but it is the cost of implementation of the necessary quarantine, testing, vaccination and movement control procedures that would be required to control and eradicate an outbreak....”*

22 May 1997

Comment on OIE Code Chapter for Equine Influenza by Patricia Ellis for AHIC

*“...Introduction of EI to our population would result in an explosive epidemic with high morbidity, cancellation of racing etc. in a high value population which is closely monitored. The probability that EI would be recognised would be close to 100%...”*

31 October 2002

Email from Patricia Ellis to Rod Hoare et al

*“...In a review of equine influenza in “Infectious Diseases of Livestock with special reference to South Africa”, Jenny Mumford notes on page 857:*

*“Subclinical infections may occur in vaccinated horses but do not necessarily stimulate a four-fold increase in HI titre but still may be a source of infection for others. Significant increases in antibody may be detected in such animals using the single radial haemolysis test.”*

*Thus the lack of a four fold increase to the HI test does not rule out circulation of flu within the QS in this instance.”*

21 June 2004

Report of the Board of Inquiry appointed by the Board of the National Horseracing Authority to conduct enquiry into the causes of the Equine Influenza which started in the Western Cape in early December 2003 and spread to the Eastern Cape and Gauteng  
Judge E L King and Dr D Macdonald

The Board of Inquiry noted the following factors which contributed to this 2003 outbreak of EI in South Africa:

*“The security and access control at both the temporary quarantine facility at Durbanville and at the State Quarantine Stations at Montague Gardens was totally inadequate. Security defects at Montague Gardens had apparently been reported on numerous occasions but were not attended to (e.g. the hole in the perimeter fence near the staff quarters was eventually repaired by one of the shipping agents in order to be able to accommodate horses within the facility). There is insufficient accommodation for staff within the Montague Gardens Quarantine Station and thus a number of the staff were required to stay elsewhere. It is not clear what standard operating procedures were in place to reduce the risks of such persons spreading infection out of the quarantine facility. Private veterinarians appear to have almost unlimited access to the horses to perform non-essential procedures. Likewise, veterinarians attending to horses in quarantine were not adequately briefed on sanitary measures that had to be followed (e.g. the proper use of protective clothing and showering prior to leaving). The procedures in place to decontaminate vehicles and equipment are not described and have proven to be inadequate.*

*The lack of daily temperature records of the horses in quarantine and the vaccination of the horses against equine influenza within a few days of arrival severely compromised our ability to reconstruct the course of events in these animals. In order to facilitate the early detection of infectious processes, it is imperative that the temperatures of all horses in quarantine are recorded at least once per day. Furthermore, it is recommended that two blood samples are collected from all horses at least 14 days apart to allow confirmation of serostability to infectious agents including equine influenza. No equine influenza vaccination should be permitted prior to collection of the second blood sample.*

*The above are examples that highlight numerous shortcomings and inadequacies in security, manpower, training and procedures that collectively contributed to the failure of the quarantine system to contain equine influenza. The material consequences of this were substantial. A consultative engagement between the State Veterinary Services and the Equine Industry must be urgently*

*established in order to develop and implement an appropriate equine biosecurity system.*

*The control measures that were instituted during the outbreak of equine influenza were reactionary and in general played a role in limiting the overall extent of the incident. In the absence of an integrated emergency management plan the overall success of these measures was remarkable. It is essential that the equine industry and State Veterinary Authorities develop an integrated emergency management plan for implementation should such an event reoccur.”*

31 May 2005

Letter from Hon Warren Truss to Andrew Ramsden

*“...The circumstances that lead to the outbreak of equine influenza in the Republic of South Africa in 2003 could not happen under the current AQIS post-arrival protocol. In the South African case, factors contributing to the outbreak included inadequate equine influenza vaccination prior to export, lack of adequate isolation in pre-export and post-arrival quarantine, release of horses within three days of arrival, and movement of personnel, equipment and vehicles without any decontamination procedures. Indeed the recommendations of the report of the investigation into the outbreak (the King Report) are all standard procedures in Australia’s post-arrival protocol....”*

Subsequent events in 2007 proved this assurance to the horse industry to be without foundation.

## **2. AQIS consultation with the horse industry**

30 May 1997

Memorandum from Peter Huntington (Convenor Australian Equine Veterinary Association Quarantine Sub-Committee) to Barbara Horsfield (CEO of the Australian Veterinary Association) about proposed changes to the OIE Code Chapter on Equine Influenza:

*“...We are outraged about the apparent lack of consultation with the horse industry about these proposed changes....”*

30 June 1997

Letter from AHIC to Dr G Murray, Commonwealth Chief Veterinary Officer about a revision of the OIE International Animal Health Code Chapter for equine influenza:

*“...The Australian Horse Industry Council is dismayed that information about such an important matter was not made available by the Office if the CVO directly to the Australian Horse Industry Council. It is disappointing that the Council has to learn of such important proposals by accident....”*

25 July 1997

Minutes of AHIC Board meeting:

*"...Hoare would follow up on the CVO's request for closer links and discussion..."*

3 November 1997

Letter from Ann McDonald to AHIC:

*"...AQIS has a commitment to a shared responsibility and consultation with industry on quarantine and export matters."*

31 October 2002

Email from Hugh Millar to Patricia Ellis

*"I was aware that something was occurring at Eastern Creek quarantine station, and that EI was of concern, but no details or official consultation have been forthcoming from AQIS (to VetCom or CCEAD). That alone is of concern..."*

*This incident, like the WNV case, serves to highlight the fundamental importance of secure PAQ. It also highlights the weakness in our approach whereby multiple groups are commingled at the point of export. Delays while incidents such as this one are being investigated is the price importers have to pay for the convenience, practicality and cost saving of multiple consignments travelling together.*

*With respect to release of the horses, it is always difficult to reconcile release from quarantine while the result of a test (for an exotic disease) is pending. If there is sufficient concern to do the test, there are sufficient grounds to hold the horses, in my view."*

29 August 2006

Letter from Sue Bennett (Crispin Bennett International Horse Transport) to Kylie Lance (AQIS) re AQIS cost increase:

*"...In closing, we are disappointed that AQIS has not genuinely consulted with all sectors before announcing this cost increase. Industry consultation may have given AQIS a different perspective on cost increase and how to implement it, eg. A standard fee per consignment based on the species, number of head and times inspected, method of transport, importing country, and distance of animals from an AQIS Office."*

21 May 2007

Letter from AHIC to AQIS (and others) re introduction of vendor declaration forms for horses destined for human consumption in overseas markets:

*“...the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) has approved introduction of vendor declaration forms for the horse industry to satisfy requirements of the European Union (EU). Neither AHIC nor any other part of the Australian horse industry (apart from the processing companies) has had any communication about these vendor declaration forms.*

*AHIC considers this complete lack of industry consultation is unacceptable. AQIS indicates that it was the role of the processing companies to undertake this consultation; nevertheless AQIS is the responsible entity to oversee the introduction of vendor declarations. Any reasons that AQIS might have for overlooking the fact that industry was never consulted or informed about this move remain a mystery.*

*The AQIS response to PIRSA demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of how the Australian horse industry is structured. Requirements for identification of individual horses, ability to trace back to property of origin, and a truthful declaration of the previous treatment of horses are impossible in all but a very few instances in the horse industry as it is currently structured.”*

29 May 2007

Letter from Dugald MacLachlan (Chemical Residues Program, Technical Standards Branch, Exports, AQIS) to AHIC:

*“The horse vendor declaration is a component of horse processing establishments systems for sourcing horses that meet the requirements of both the Australian Standard for the Hygienic Production and Transportation of meat and Meat Products for Human Consumption and the European Commission (EC). It is unfortunate that extensive consultation was not able to be undertaken in developing the vendor declaration due to the short time available to respond to concerns of the EC. The concerns you raised were considered in developing the vendor declaration.*

*AQIS welcomes any efforts by your organisation to educate the Australian horse industry on the importance of providing accurate information on vendor declarations required by export processing establishments. We would be glad to provide assistance in these endeavours.”*

22 August 2007

Email from Patricia Ellis to Bob Biddle, Acting Commonwealth Chief Veterinary Officer

*“I have had a lengthy conversation tonight with one of the private practitioners who has been involved with the care of the imported horses currently detained in Eastern Creek Quarantine Station.*

*I understand from that conversation that horses have been detained in ECQS because of pyrexia of unknown origin in some horses and, that the consignment includes horses directly imported from Japan, a country in which an outbreak of equine influenza is currently occurring.*

*I also understand from that conversation that there will be a government teleconference tomorrow to discuss the health status of these horses and their test results.*

*As a representative of the Australian Racing Board and the Australian Horse Industry Council, I write to express the extreme disappointment of ARB and AHIC that no attempt has been made to consult with or include the Australian horse industry in such discussions....”*

4 December 2007

Email from Sue Bennett (Crispin Bennett International Horse Transport) to Joffrid Mackett (Manager, Live Animal Exports, AQIS):

*“...The continued lack of industry consultation is unacceptable and needs to be addressed forthwith. The idea that AQIS does not have to consult with industry seems to have taken root since the out break of equine influenza. Whilst this attitude may be acceptable in the face of an emergency disease outbreak it should not become the standard modus operandi when dealing with routine matters. AQIS would do well to remember that all horse exporters are customers and pay for AQIS services.”*

6 December 2007

Letter from Joffrid Mackett (Manager, Live Animal Exports, AQIS) to Sue Bennett of Crispin Bennett International Horse Transport:

*“... As there is no peak industry body servicing the equine industry the consultation process on matters relating to horse exports is difficult....and the group will need to be able to refer issues to the wider industry for comment and bring back to AQIS a considered response representative of the horse export industry.”*

10 December 2007

Letter from AHIC to Joffrid Mackett (AQIS):

*“...You might be interested to know that the Australian Horse Industry Council Inc. (AHIC) and its predecessor the Australian Horse Council have been representing the Australian horse industry at a national level for well over 20 years.....”*

*AHIC has communicated with AQIS and other Commonwealth Departments on behalf of the horse industry on a wide range of issues over that time. AHIC has*

*been in consultation with a number of people within the Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry during 2007 on a number of different issues.”*

### **3. Quarantine Protocols**

24 August 1995

Letter from Peter J Huntington President Australian Equine Veterinary Association to Dr. Geoff Ryan, AQIS:

*“..It is the view of AEVA that the status of a particular country with regard to Equine Influenza should be the main determinant in setting separation distances for PEQ, not basing these on commercial pressures. ....While the hundred metre separation is not based on hard scientific fact it does provide for a margin of error in terms of knowledge about the aerosol spread of Equine Influenza. Surely that is preferable in situations where Equine Influenza is endemic.*

*...For the current protocols to be an effective barrier to the introduction of disease we require adequate supervision of PEQ and the standards for certification in other countries. It would appear the number of flights that are accompanied or supervised by an Australian veterinarian is reducing and we are relying on other countries to serve our interests. This process needs to be closely supervised and strongly audited because at the end of the day it will not be the other country that suffers if something goes wrong. If everything goes according to plan then we will not have disease introductions. We would like some assurance about the auditing of the certification process and PEQ facilities including the frequency of and intensity of such scrutiny...”*

17 October 1996

Letter from Ian L. Neilsen (Convenor Quarantine Committee Australian Horse Council) to Mr. Andrew Carroll, Acting manager, Animal Programs, AQIS:

*“...Discussion was held with regard to the VRC request for the period of PAQ being reduced for the overseas horses entered for the Melbourne Cup.*

*The Committee decided by majority, that the 14 day PAQ period should not be reduced.”*

18 October 1996

Article in The Australian by Brendan Cormick re ability of European horses to compete in the Melbourne Cup:

*“...a rewriting of the quarantine laws seemed the only way the horses will be allowed to contest the Flemington race on November 5.*

*Mr. John Anderson, Minister for Primary Industry and Energy, was last night asked to approve a shortening of the post-arrival quarantine period for the*

*European pair after an extraordinary phone hook-up of the technical sub-committee on quarantine for the Australian Horse Council recommended the horses be refused entry in the interest of safety for the national horse population.*

*Outbreaks of equine influenza in France have caused concern...*

*.....While the outbreaks have not been reported near that racing centre, the risk, no matter how small, of such an outbreak in Australia could cripple the horse industry....”*

There appear to be many instances over the years where individuals and organisations have run to Ministers or senior government officials and requested them to overrule quarantine protocols and decisions. Such requests stem from purely self-serving reasons and are not promoted with the best interests of the national horse industry in mind. It can be difficult for Ministers and others to resist pressure from such high profile, well resourced sources, but resist they must. Quarantine must be run according to preset procedures and protocols, unless there is a pressing need of animal welfare or the interests of the national horse herd are at risk. All other reasons must not override these basic well-founded rules of quarantine.

18 October 1996

Fax from Sarah Kahn (Assistant Director Animal Quarantine Policy) to Mr. Ron Southern ATCO Ltd and Canadian Utilities Limited:

*“...Australia’s current temporary import requirements for horses for competition or racing require that the horses undergo 14 days quarantine prior to export and 14 days post arrival quarantine in Australia. While the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) wished to facilitate international movement of horses, the risk of introduction of exotic diseases must be maintained.*

*....Although vaccination against equine influenza is compulsory for all horses that are shipped to Australia, immunity may be short lived, vaccination breakdowns have been demonstrated and questions have been raised concerning vaccine efficacy. Vaccinated horses may still shed virus for up to 7 days post infection. Obviously these horses are of great concern as their clinical symptoms can be masked but they may be a potent source of virus. These considerations have been taken into account when developing quarantine protocols for horses imported into Australia. The post arrival quarantine period is implemented to ensure that incubating diseases of concern are revealed before the Australian horse population is exposed to the imported horse....”*

Thus AQIS has been aware for a long time about problems presented by EI infection in vaccinated horses. Vague and atypical clinical signs can mask infection and make diagnosis difficult.

6 December 1999

Quarantine Operational Notice 1999/108 from Fiona Sunderman, Principal Veterinary Officer Live Animal Imports

“Policy for access to horses during quarantine”

*“.....The main disease of concern is Equine Influenza that is readily transmitted through virus in the expired air of infected horses.....”*

*....Owners, trainers and agents are only permitted to visit animals that directly concern them. Photographers, media personnel, prospective buyers, veterinarians engaged to perform elective services and similar people will not be permitted access to the horses whilst in quarantine.*

*It is unlikely that any non-essential personnel will be permitted access to any horses in a consignment in which there is one or more horses suspected of having a contagious disease.*

*...All people given approval to visit horses in quarantine will be required to observe the following conditions:*

*.....*

*Essential personnel must:*

- wear protective clothing and footwear (provided by the facility) at all times; **and***
- shower prior to leaving the facility*

*Non-essential people will only be permitted to view their horses from an approved viewing area. This arrangement will ensure that a minimum of 5 metres distance is maintained between the horse and its visitor.”*

It would be interesting to know why this 1999 Operational Notice was not being implemented in 2007.

#### **4. Quarantine facilities for horses**

1989

Australian Horse Council Annual General Meeting

Discussion emphasised the importance of dedicated quarantine facilities for horses (this time in relation to mares potentially infected with Equine Herpes Virus 1, a cause of abortion)

26 October 1995

Fax from Professor Keith Hughes (Dean School and Faculty of Veterinary Science, The University of Queensland) to Quentin Wallace, Australian Horse Council. Re accommodation of racing horses in quarantine:

*“...Any risk is confined to human error during the management of horses while in quarantine, i.e. if there are variations to management or breakdowns in security....”*

22 November 1995

Letter from Joanne Spears (Director, Thoroughbred Breeders Australia) to Mr. Quentin Wallace (Australian Horse Council):

*“...Thoroughbred Breeders Australia is concerned about the current quarantine facilities available for horses, especially in regards to the large importation of ‘shuttle stallions’ each season.... Thoroughbred Breeders Australia believes that to ensure the internationalization of our industry, we must present – as much as possible – a risk free environment.*

*Without adequate facilities this cannot happen.....”*

19 December 1995

Letter from Quentin Wallace (Honorary Secretary, Australian Horse Council) to Joanne Spears (Director, Thoroughbred Breeders Australia):

*“.....Your suggestion that Australia needs a specialist quarantine station with adequate veterinary facilities is admirable and a goal that AHC should aim at, however taking a more pragmatic view I cannot see any government providing the necessary funding without significant financial support from industry....”*

29 February 1996

Australian Horse Council response to the Australian Quarantine Review Committee:

*“...The indigenous horse population should not be placed at risk by removal of a horse from quarantine premises if it becomes ill during quarantine. All government and non-government quarantine facilities must operate with adequate arrangements to ensure that any non-exotic diseases or emergencies which affect imported horses during quarantine ...do not compromise quarantine security. This is not the case at present....”*

## **5. Privatisation of Quarantine**

29 February 1996

Australian Horse Council submission to the Australian Quarantine Review Committee:

### *7.1 Privatisation/commercialisation*

*The AHC opposes any further deregulation or privatisation of post arrival quarantine for permanently imported horses. Existing government quarantine stations for horses must continue to be owned and operated by government.*

*Private owners and operators are under commercial pressure and have a vested interest in cutting corners. They would not suffer the full consequences of an exotic disease outbreak.*

*Non-government quarantine facilities for short-stay competition horses must be constructed to the same standard as government facilities and be operated by an approved sporting organisation, not private individuals. Facilities must be located in areas which pose minimal risk to domestic horses and operate under agreed contingency plans in the vent of an exotic disease outbreak. The number and location of non-government facilities in each State must not compromise the ability of AQIS to provide appropriate supervision. Given current resources, AQIS capacity to deliver the necessary degree of supervision would appear to be limited.*

*.....AQIS must have the staff and funds to audit programs closely and the legislative and political power to apply sanctions for non-compliance when appropriate.”*

April 1999

“Privatisation of animal quarantine station services” Discussion Paper from AQIS

*“... Their basic function is to protect against the entry of animal pests and diseases present in the country of origin that may not be detectable at the time of arrival. The Animal Quarantine Stations Program comprises the management and operation of government facilities for the quarantine of imported animals after they have arrived in Australia.*

*The Nairn Review went on to stipulate that ‘...the extension of these principles to the private ownership of high security quarantine stations and facilities should be introduced gradually, and only after a reasonable time to assess experience with privatised low to medium risk stations’...*

*...While Nairn (1996) believed that the Government agency should develop national quarantine policy and ensure national delivery of quarantine services, this does not necessarily include the actual delivery component of the process.*

*Government itself usually undertakes activities aimed at protecting or improving the welfare of the Australian community, often termed ‘community service obligations’. Activities undertaken for the public good most commonly occur where:*

- the beneficiaries are diverse and not readily identifiable i.e. include substantial sectors of the community*
- other organisations would not elect to perform these duties on a commercial basis; or*
- they involve responsibilities that governments do not require other organisations in the public or private sectors to generally undertake.*

*Government involvement in quarantine primarily occurs due to failure of the voluntary market to cope with pest and disease risks. Certain areas would be under-supplied relative to the level desired by the Australian community, if left to the private sector. In some instances, the beneficiaries of quarantine activities are also difficult to identify.....*

*...The decision to commercialise, corporatise or privatize individual services within the Australian Federal Government sphere requires a case by case assessment of the potential economic and social benefits and costs. In the case of quarantine matters, the issue of potential risk is also a key factor requiring assessment.*

*...the Hilmer Report....*

*6 .Foster competitive neutrality between government and private sector businesses where they compete in the same market.*

*This last recommendation is of particular relevance to ownership of quarantine station considerations. Government businesses often enjoy a unique set of competitive advantages by virtue of their ownership, including exemption from taxation and government-backed financial guarantees.*

*....*

*The following benefits of private quarantine stations have been identified:*

- clients are provided with a choice of stations with potentially different levels of service*
- stations may open at locations not previously services i.e. easier access for clients*
- the government redistributes part of the business risk associated with the stations to the private sector*
- a reduction in the capital invested in infrastructure by the Government*

*.....*

*The following concerns with private animal quarantine stations have been identified:*

- a possible reduction in or loss of quarantine security, potentially leading to serious outbreaks of disease, and integrity of Australia's animal health system*
- implementing a system that may be more complex than the existing system e.g. diversely located, involve multiple administrative groups and require different AQIS resource structure*
- a private station system administered by AQIS may not be a more cost effective system for the client.....It is expected that private sector rates for quarantine facilities, in addition to the charges levied on these private facilities for AQIS input into the program, will result in an increase in the net cost to the importer.*

.....

*The animal quarantine stations provide the management and operation of facilities for the quarantine of imported animals after they have arrived in Australia. They are responsible for:*

- *provision of secure housing for imported animals;*
- *conveyancing of the animals under quarantine from the airports or other ports of entry;*
- *daily monitoring of animal health and welfare for the prescribed quarantine time;*
- *satisfaction of the husbandry needs of animals in quarantine; and*
- *maintenance of liaison with the owner/agents of imported animals and their veterinary surgeons.*

*It would be expected that under any privatized arrangement, these functions/services would be discharged by the operator.*

*.....The inspection of the certificates and animals forms an essential part of auditing the exporting country's certification. These functions will be retained by AQIS along with:*

- *administering guidelines for private quarantine facilities including inspection and approval for use; and*
- *auditing quality assurance arrangements and ensuring all import requirements are met.*

Interestingly the contents of this 1999 Discussion Paper have not been brought to the attention of industry in the most recent discussions about privatisation of post-arrival quarantine of horses.

19 April 1999

Fax from Dr. Patricia Ellis to Rod Hoare about the AQIS "Privatisation of animal quarantine station services" Discussion Paper

*"I am totally opposed any further deregulation or privatisation of post-arrival quarantine for permanently imported horses. Existing government quarantine stations for horses must continue to be owned and operated by government, Private owners and operators are under commercial pressure and have a vested interest in cutting corners to save costs/placate powerful owners. They would not suffer the full consequences of an exotic disease outbreak but the horse industry would, particularly if equine influenza gained entry. It may be a benefit for Government if "the Government redistributes part of the business risk associated with the stations to the private sector" but the whole domestic horse industry will then be forced to carry an increased risk of entry of exotic disease and will be powerless in managing that risk.*

.....Given current resources, AQIS operational capacity to deliver the necessary degree of supervision for private quarantine stations would appear to be very limited given the cuts to staff in AQIS livestock programs in the State offices....”

20 April 1999

Fax from Alex Morgan, Victorian Horse Council to Rod Hoare AHIC re privatisation of quarantine stations

*“1. We oppose privatisation of Quarantine Stations to those whose interest is profit driven. Given present facilities exceed demand and a private system overseen by AQIS could result in increase cost to importers.*

*2. We would consider the “Privatisation” of Quarantine Stations to Industry/Sporting Organisations in pursuit of globalizing their area as opposed to financial gain e.g. Sandown*

*3. In the event of a breakdown of quarantine resulting in disease outbreak what financial obligations would the provider have in controlling and or eradicating the disease.*

*4. Private facilities may be in areas that would make the required level of supervision questionable given the number of AQIS officers available.”*

23 May 1999

Email from Quentin Wallace to Patricia Ellis re the Privatisation of animal quarantine stations Discussion Paper from AQIS

“... ”

*If it is simply the private operation of Eastern Creek etc then I guess it is hard to argue against this if the proper controls over integrity & cost are put in place. If the thrust is to close the existing stations and then leave it to private operators to establish quarantine facilities then I am against it.*

*1. For a private operator to build an extensive facility as an equine quarantine station they would need to be guaranteed all the traffic to give the project some commercial sense.*

*2. If 1. above was not the case, then it is conceivable we could see lots of importers trying to get approval of small private quarantines (a la the facilities used for CEM surveillance). Inevitably, without an anticipated regular cash flow these applications would be likely to fail due to inappropriate facilities and ‘shared’ labour practices that are hardly likely to meet AQIS approval. Also, the facilities are likely to be in existing horse areas.*

*....it becomes essential there is a central facility to ensure a competitive service is provided and the standard of buildings and care maintained...”*

Undated, but about 12 June 2003

Letter from George Hughes, Senior Scientific Officer, Live Animal Imports, AQIS to ?? (Rod Hoare)

Re the proposal by AQIS *“....to require importers to hire a private veterinarian for first examination and collection of the blood sample, and an AQIS veterinarian performing the final examination.*

*AQIS believes that the professional standard required of practicing veterinarians will ensure the simple examination and collection of a blood sample will be carried out effectively.. AQIS recognises that importers are concerned about the wellbeing of their charges whilst in quarantine and that this modification to current procedures provides the importer with greater choice as to who they wish to examine their animals. The time saved by AQIS veterinarians not undertaking the initial examinations and blood collections can be used to concentrate on higher risk quarantine issues. However, AQIS considers that AQIS veterinarians should examine and release the horses from quarantine control once the post arrival quarantine period ends.”*

12 June 2003

Email from Patricia Ellis to Hugh Millar

*“Out of interest I wonder if the Animal Health Committee is ever copied in on these AQIS initiatives?”*

*Like Rod, I am uneasy about conflict of interest and even more importantly I hope (if this ever is adopted) that these private practitioners will undergo rigorous decontamination before they return to circulate among the Australian horse population.*

*Frankly, unless there is rigorous and supervised decontamination, private practitioners hired by the importer are the last people I want intimately contacting recently imported horses.*

*The reasons advanced by AQIS for the change do not satisfy me.*

*“The time saved by AQIS veterinarians not undertaking the initial examinations and blood collections can be used to concentrate on higher risk quarantine issues.”*

*I think the health of horses immediately after import IS a high risk quarantine issue and should not be delegated to the private sector. Am I over-reacting?*

*Perhaps the AQIS agenda is being driven by non-quarantine issues such as overtime, OH&S and liability? Dare say the tick inspection of perineum, inguinal and nether regions may make some of the govt vets leery!”*

See also the statement from Dr. Phil Widders (at EII.0002.001.0038) where he refers to OH&S and litigation issues.

16 June 2003

Email from Michael Morris, Longford TAS to Barry Smyth et al

*“...This is yet another example of a Govt Department abrogating its responsibility because they are not prepared to resource it adequately. I find this attitude amazing in the present climate of heightened exotic disease awareness.*

*In a similar vein private practitioners here and I presume elsewhere are being asked to keep a statistical record of cases seen, and report this to the Dept Of Primary Industry. I feel sure this is in recognition that they themselves are not doing sufficient in terms of disease surveillance, and are hoping these stats may help meet their international obligations...”*

17 June 2003

Email from Hugh Millar to Patricia Ellis

*In short, AHC not consulted on these matters.*

*My comments:*

*Biosecurity issues need rigorous management and supervision.*

*All private practitioners so used (if used) must be fully APAV accredited first.*

*Private practitioners need to sign undertakings not to contact other horses that day.*

*Real prospects of conflict of interest...”*

18 June 2003

Email from Quentin Wallace to George Hughes and forwarded to AHIC Quarantine and Health Committee

“.....

*2. Identification, tick examination, nasal discharge etc are matters of quarantine concern and should be the focus of quarantine vets not owners nominated practitioners who may not be that familiar with quarantine concerns.*

*3. The drawing of blood for the serum bank should be completed by quarantine vets to ensure absolute quarantine integrity.*

*4. Introducing private vets to complete quarantine checks & procedures introduces conflict of interest issues.*

*5. The present procedure has not resulted in any breach of quarantine to my knowledge, so why interfere with the existing proven system.*

*6. Increase in disease risk through added contact between private vets attending to the general herd as well as horses in PAQ.*

*.....We do not support AQIS' proposal for private vets to undertake quarantine inspection duties in PAQ....”*

19 June 2003

Email from Dr. Rod Hoare AHIC to George Hughes (Senior Scientific Officer, Live Animal Imports, AQIS) about proposed increased use of private veterinary practitioners in post-arrival quarantine for imported horses, and reduced involvement of AQIS veterinarians:

*"I sent the document to the AHIC Quarantine Committee. No member was in favour although some could see some points of merit. I received about 10 written replies and a selection of comments are copied for your information;*

- *It will further remove AQIS vets from the practical side of their job, which they might ultimately regret one day when all their practical skills are lost. It would be interesting to find out what the AQIS veterinary officers doing the inspections/bleeding think about it.*
- *AQIS needs to hire some veterinarians with interest and expertise in the horse industry.*
- *Introducing private vets to complete quarantine checks & procedures introduces conflict of interest issues.*
- *The drawing of blood for the serum bank should be completed by quarantine vets to ensure absolute quarantine integrity.*
- *This is yet another example of a Govt Department abrogating its responsibility because they are not prepared to resource it adequately. I find this attitude amazing in the present climate of heightened exotic disease awareness.*
- *There needs to be additional independent checks and responsibility when it comes to exotic disease detection.*
- *Limiting potential spread of disease is a major concern and the fewer people with access to a quarantine facility the better.*
- *The prospect of a number of private veterinarians entering and leaving quarantine premises must increase the risk of an incident. Does AQIS accept responsibility for the supervision of these visits and any outbreak that may occur?*
- *The comment that the AQIS vets can concentrate on "higher risk issues" indicates there is a shortage of vets with the expertise in the department or horse health issues are not, in their opinion, high risk.*

*Little joy there for the proposal. We thank you for the opportunity to comment."*

See also statement from Dr Phil Widders (EII.0002.001.0039) where he notes that this rejection of the use of private veterinarians from AHIC has not been included in AQIS advice.

24 September 2004

Letter from Andrew Ramsden Chairman Australian Racing Board Limited to The Honourable Warren Truss Federal Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and

Forestry, cc'd to AHIC about Inspection of Recently Imported Horses during Post Arrival Quarantine.

*".....Your announcement does not reveal that AQIS plans to compromise the security of post arrival quarantine for horses and abrogate its responsibility to the horse industry by devolving the PAQ duties of AQIS veterinary officers to private veterinarians. This is totally unacceptable. Any quarantine function which requires veterinary input should be performed by an AQIS Veterinary Officer.*

*There is another aspect of the AQIS proposal which causes the ARB extreme concern. If AQIS implements this policy, it should be mindful of its potential liability in relation to any future signature of the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement by the horse industry.*

*On the one hand a division of your Department (the Strategic Policy Unit) and Animal Health Australia, are actively soliciting the horse industry's signature of the EADRA, a signature which commits the horse industry to paying for 80% of the response costs for any equine influenza incursion to Australia. On the other hand AQIS, another department for which falls under your Ministerial responsibility, is proposing radical changes which history and epidemiological evidence have proven will significantly increase the risk of an equine influenza outbreak in Australia....*

*....The proposed devolution of the PAQ responsibilities from AQIS veterinary officers to the private veterinarians potentially compromises rather than strengthens national biosecurity measures to prevent the entry of significant horse industry diseases and, in our opinion, breached the good faith of EADRA.*

*The ARB will NOT pay 80% of its share of any response costs for an emergency disease outbreak which directly arises from any quarantine breakdown if the AQIS proposal is implemented. The ARB expects that the Commonwealth will assume full responsibility for the response costs of any such incident..."*

6 May 2005

Letter from Andrew Ramsden to Hon Warren Truss

*"....If an AQIS veterinary officer is not physically present when important inspections of imported horses are being conducted by un-trained quarantine officers or by private veterinary practitioners, how can your Department claim that these procedures are under the **direct** control of an AQIS veterinary officer?"*

*Equine influenza is the exotic disease that the Australian horse industry most fears. If equine influenza gained entry to Australia, it would close down racing and other horse events for several months with catastrophic economic consequences. A quarantine breakdown is the only way Australia will be exposed to this exotic disease. As recently as November 2003, private veterinarians*

*attending recently imported horses during post arrival quarantine played a prominent role in a quarantine breakdown which led to a closedown of racing in the Republic of South Africa until mid February 2004.*

*The Australian Racing Board considers that the recent changes implemented by AQIS compromise national biosecurity to prevent the entry of exotic horse diseases...*

31 May 2005

Letter from Hon Warren Truss to Andrew Ramsden

*"...The circumstances that lead to the outbreak of equine influenza in the Republic of South Africa in 2003 could not happen under the current AQIS post-arrival protocol. In the South African case, factors contributing to the outbreak included inadequate equine influenza vaccination prior to export, lack of adequate isolation in pre-export and post-arrival quarantine, release of horses within three days of arrival, and movement of personnel, equipment and vehicles without any decontamination procedures. Indeed the recommendations of the report of the investigation into the outbreak (the King Report) are all standard procedures in Australia's post-arrival protocol..."*

25 July 2006

Email from Patricia Ellis (as Convenor of the AHIC Quarantine and Health Committee) re consultation with Dr. Terry Roberson (consultant hired by AQIS) about privatisation of PAQ for horses:

*"...As yet, AQIS does not seem to have prepared a discussion paper regarding the matter so am sorry but I have nothing official to forward you. Hopefully when this consultant completes her report a discussion paper will be prepared by AQIS and circulated widely for comment. The consultation being undertaken to date on such an important matter seems to be very ad hoc.*

*The suggestion is not new. Privatisation of quarantine facilities was recommended in both the Lindsay Review in 1988 and the Nairn Review in 1996 and has been steadfastly opposed by the Australian Horse Industry Council.*

14 August 2006

Letter from AHIC to Ms. Joanna Hewitt (Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry). (Letter also sent to Dr. Brian Radunz, Chair of Animal Health Committee):

*"...During July 2006, some Australian based international equine shipping agents and representatives of Australian horse industry organisations were contacted by a consultant contracted by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) to discuss options for the future direction of PAQ*

*programs for horses. No discussion paper on the issue was provided and no structured consultation was conducted.*

*Currently there are government quarantine stations for horses at Spotswood in Melbourne and Eastern Creek in Sydney. The Commonwealth sold both government quarantine stations some time ago and leased them back. Government access to and operation of both stations is assured until at least 2010 but after that the future is uncertain.*

*One of the options, and possibly the most likely one, is that facilities for PAQ of horses will be privatised.*

### **Australian horse industry concerns**

*The AHIC strongly opposes privatisation of horse quarantine. Internationally, history and epidemiological evidence have proven that poorly managed PAQ significantly increases the risk of an equine influenza (EI) incursion, the exotic emergency disease of most concern for the Australian horse industry. The only reason that Australia has remained as one of the few countries in the world that is free of EI is because of its strict independently supervised PAQ program.*

*The AHIC is concerned that that de-regulation of PAQ will inevitably lead to lowering of standards and the introduction of EI and other exotic emergency equine diseases (EADs) to Australia. An outbreak of EI could close down all Australian horse industry activity for at least 4 months with grave economic consequences.*

*The horse industry would not be the only stakeholder affected by an emergency exotic equine disease incursion. State governments also derive substantial income directly from wagering activities, and could also be responsible for sharing emergency animal disease response costs.*

*Privately operated quarantine stations:-*

- will create an imbalance in risk equity (essentially the horse industry bears almost all of the risk)*
- will not be financially viable without a substantial reduction of quarantine standards*
- will potentially create import bottleneck situations at times of high seasonal demand*
- may result in lack of equity of access if a Government sanctioned monopoly is operated by a single shipping agent*
- will introduce significant potential for commercial considerations and conflict of interest to compromise mandated quarantine standards*
- are very unlikely to be adequately supervised and audited by AQIS, given*

- AQIS's poor performance in the supervision and audit of deregulated export of livestock. In this instance, a "Keniry review" will be far too late!
- the current large backlog of audits of quarantine approved premises due to lack of AQIS resources
- will weaken national border security and increase the potential liability of the horse industry in the event of a quarantine breach. The Commonwealth has obligations under Section 14 of the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) to reduce the risk of entry of EADs at national level and, at the same time, is actively urging the horse industry to sign the EADRA and thus consequently assume 80% of the costs of any EI incursion brought on by a quarantine breach by the Commonwealth.

### **Horse Quarantine Station at Sandown Racecourse in Melbourne**

*The creation and continued successful operation of Sandown Quarantine Station by Racing Victoria Limited (RVL) as a "privately" owned and operated quarantine station cannot be used by AQIS as a precedent for blanket approval of privatised quarantine stations.*

*The AHIC does not regard Sandown as a "privately" operated quarantine station as it is operated by a jurisdictional horse industry sector, not for profit, but as a subsidized service to the Victorian Thoroughbred horse racing industry.*

*Risk equity is balanced in this instance, because RVL is both a risk producer-beneficiary and a major risk bearer. RVL is acutely aware of the importance of risk equity and of the catastrophic impact of an EAD outbreak would have on the Australian racing industry and the horse industry generally.*

*RVL acknowledgment and acceptance of the need for balanced risk equity is reflected in the costs of operating Sandown Quarantine Station. Sophisticated security technology is used and, professional security guards and experienced, non-government veterinarians oversee its operation 24 hours a day. No commercial operator could own, operate and make a profit from a privately managed quarantine station if it were run according to the standard operating procedures currently in place at Sandown.*

*Sandown operates at a higher security level than the government stations because RVL has a vested interest in making sure it does, and they are not there "just to make a buck." As for monitoring by AQIS, such "monitoring" of Sandown by AQIS has been deficient in recent years. The decision by AQIS to reduce the number of veterinarians on staff has resulted in an unacceptable reduction in technical expertise available to the horse industry in quarantine matters.*

*Of over-riding concern is that it seems that there is a firm mindset within AQIS that privatisation of PAQ for horses is a “done deal” because the real estate has been sold and the leases are about to run out. AHIC considers that the horse industry consultation currently being undertaken is a procedural lip service “Clayton’s” exercise, but the decision to privatise has already been undertaken by AQIS and is inevitable and irrevocable, regardless of the views of the horse industry. We regard this as totally unacceptable. “*

13 November 2006

Letter from Dr. John Stratton (Secretary, Animal Health Committee) to AHIC:

*“...Animal Health Committee (AHC) has been involved in considering the broader issue of Australian post-border quarantine arrangements through a working group. However, it has not specifically considered privatisation, which is a new issue.*

*AQIS has advised AHC that it is in the early stages of a process to consider possible privatisation of PAQ facilities and is undertaking preliminary industry consultation to gauge an initial response. This input will be incorporated into the more details development of options which will go out for broader consultation, including to AHC.*

*AHC will carefully consider this issue when AQIS has more fully developed its proposals, such that AHC is presented with sufficient details to permit meaningful analysis.”*

27 November 2006

Letter from AHIC to Jenni Gordon (Executive Manager, Quarantine and Plant Programs, AQIS):

*“...I understand that Dr. Roberson has submitted a report to AQIS about her brief preliminary industry consultation on this proposal. Would it be possible for AHIC to obtain a copy of Dr. Roberson’s report so that we can be better informed of any developments?*

*AHIC would like to be kept fully informed about any developments on this proposal so that we can continue to consult with the Australian horse industry in a timely manner.”*

14 December 2006

Letter from Dr. Narelle Clegg (National Manager, Animal Programs, AQIS) to AHIC in response to the 27 November 2006 letter to Jenni Gordon:

*“...AQIS acknowledges that further consultation with the horse industry will be required to further explore options that manage industry’s concerns as well as*

*addressing the implications of further changes to the operation of existing quarantine stations. To this end, AQIS presented a paper to AHC at its October meeting, providing background information about the situation with the existing stations and setting out a proposed consultative strategy for further cat, dog, and horse industry consultation. A copy of this paper is attached. AHC endorsed this strategy and consistent with it, AQIS is developing a discussion paper about options for horse quarantine that will be distributed in February 2007.”*

24 – 26 October 2007

Animal Health Committee (Attachment to letter from Dr. Narelle Clegg, 14 December 2006 above)

Agenda Item 18.1 Future Options for Post Arrival Quarantine Facilities (authored by David Ironside, Manager, Live Animal Imports Date 16/10/06),

- under Issues:

*9. Discussions with stakeholders in the equine industry, in contrast to those in the dog/cat industry, revealed a number of concerns regarding the [possible move to AQIS supervised privately owned post arrival quarantine facilities.*

*10. The concerns raised fell broadly into two categories, border control integrity and commercial concerns. Stakeholders are concerned that allowing the private sector to operate private quarantine stations could increase the risk of introducing equine influenza into Australia. Commercial concerns tended to centre of financial viability and liability issues.*

*11. AQIS acknowledges that these concerns are genuine and further consultation with horse industry is required to explore options which manage these concerns as well as addressing the implications of fixture changes to the operation of both Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations.*

*12. An outline of the proposed strategy for ongoing consultation with horse industry stakeholders is provided at attachment A, below.”*

In an accompanying Table entitled:

*“Post-arrival quarantine: Dogs, cats and horses – Outline of proposed consultative process.”,*

a discussion paper was to have been developed by AQIS by end January 2007 and distributed to industry in February 2007.

23 April 2007

Letter from AHIC to Dr. Narelle Clegg (National Manager, Animal Programs, AQIS):

*“...In a letter dated 14 December 2006 you indicated that a discussion paper would be circulated to industry for comment in February 2007.*

*To this time AHIC (or any other horse industry organisation) has not received any further correspondence or information about this discussion paper.*

*Could you please inform AHIC by return mail where this discussion paper is?*

*It is imperative that the horse industry is kept informed and participates fully in any discussions about this issue of vital interest to the industry.”*

Undated, but about 31 May 2007 (contemporaneous with a letter from Hon. Peter McGauran with similar wording on that date)

Letter from Peter Liehne, National Manager, Animal and Plant Quarantine

*“...Once consideration of the related high level matters is complete, the range of options available for the provision of future quarantine facilities, including horse quarantine facilities, will be clarified. At that time, AQIS will consult again with AHIC and circulate a discussion paper about the relevant options.”*

To 31 December 2007, AHIC has not received any further news about this proposed discussion paper on privatisation of post-arrival quarantine facilities for horses. Intervening events associated with the EI emergency have probably provided a significant distraction to these discussions.

## **6. Vaccines for Equine Influenza**

8 February 1992

J. Wood and Dr. J Mumford, The Veterinary Record page 126 Letter ‘Epidemiology of equine influenza’

*...In some horses vaccination often did not prevent infection, although the severity of and duration of disease were reduced. ....the level of antibody required to induce solid protection against infection is not always attained by currently available vaccines, other than for brief periods. Natural infection, in contrast, will provide clinical protection for at least one year....”*

It seems that little has changed in the intervening 16 years to 2008.

24 August 1995

Letter from Peter J Huntington President Australian Equine Veterinary Association to Dr. Geoff Ryan AQIS:

*“...A number of protocols have contained requirements for vaccination that do not specify that the vaccine should be used in accordance with the manufacturer’s directions. In many cases it may be that a single dose could be used by people when a double dose was required...”*

30 November 1995

Fax from Dr Peter Huntington (Rhone-Poulenc) to Quentin Wallace AHC quoting Dr. Jenny Hodgson (Newmarket UK):

*"...There certainly seems to be consensus both amongst the people here and the people at the EI conference that all the vaccines currently made and marketed in the USA are not very useful.....Basically, I think their problem is that they don't contain up to date strains and they don't induce very strong immunity anyway..."*

*"It is worth noting, however, that all the vaccines sold here have had vaccine breakdowns recorded this year, though these do appear to be relatively few and far between (especially in comparison to those reported in the USA). I guess consensus is that the vaccines are quite useful, but do need updating..."*

18 April 1996

Attachment to Fax from Dr. Jenny Hodgson Equine Research Centre Onderstepoort to Quentin Wallace (Australian Horse Council):

*"...there was no formal procedure for recommending new vaccine strains and although there was close co-operation between OIE laboratories and WHO Reference Laboratories there was no designated group of experts convened to exchange information on a regular basis and to provide a unified opinion on the need to update vaccine strains..."*

*"..With regard to the equine-2 (H3N8) influenza virus, considerable evidence has accumulated, from epidemiological investigation of outbreaks worldwide and particularly from the Saskatchewan randomized double-blind study, that the efficacy of some conventional inactivated equine influenza vaccines is poor. It is recognised that the potency of some vaccines is inadequate, but antigenic drift is also likely to be a major contributing factor. The results of equine influenza virus surveillance and characterization demonstrate that since 1987 new variants of equine-2 influenza have arisen. These fall into two large groups, here termed the "Eurasian" and "American" groups of viruses although viruses of both groups can co-circulate in a geographic region. These groups exhibit significant differences in antigenic cross-reactivity which have negative impact on performance of heterologous vaccine, **but importantly the original H3N8 prototype, virus Miami/63, is not antigenically representative of either of these groups.***

*On this basis OIE experts concurred that updated vaccines should contain recent representatives of both "Eurasian" and "American" groups of viruses..."*

26 July 1996

Letter from Dr. Jenny Hodgson (The University of Sydney) to Quentin Wallace (Australian Horse Council):

*“.....There is supposedly an e-mail list of “interested parties” in order to inform people more quickly of the International Collating Centre data on equine influenza – I will make sure that we are on that list. Furthermore, there is supposed to be annual meetings of OIE and WHO reference laboratory personnel and other equine influenza experts to review information on the viruses in current circulation, and to recommend changes in vaccine virus strains when necessary. An annual report of this meeting is supposed to be published by OIE in the OIE Bulletin and other appropriate journals. These are the intentions of the OIE people, as to whether they will eventuate I cannot say....”*

18 October 1996

Fax from Sarah Kahn (Assistant Director Animal Quarantine Policy) to Mr. Ron Southern ATCO Ltd and Canadian Utilities Limited:

*....Although vaccination against equine influenza is compulsory for all horses that are shipped to Australia, immunity may be short lived, vaccination breakdowns have been demonstrated and questions have been raised concerning vaccine efficacy. Vaccinated horses may still shed virus for up to 7 days post infection. Obviously these horses are of great concern as their clinical symptoms can be masked but they may be a potent source of virus. These considerations have been taken into account when developing quarantine protocols for horses imported into Australia. The post arrival quarantine period is implemented to ensure that incubating diseases of concern are revealed before the Australian horse population is exposed to the imported horse....”*

## **7. Diagnostic Technology and its use as an aid in Quarantine**

4 August 1995

Letter from Quentin Wallace Australian Horse Council to Sarah Kahn (Assistant Director Animal Quarantine Policy):

*“5. There is strong support within AHC for the use of directagen testing, especially from countries where Equine Influenza is known to occur, if the test can be proved to be an effective pointer towards horses that are shedding Equine Influenza Virus....”*

24 August 1995

Letter from Peter J Huntington President Australian Equine Veterinary Association to Mr. Geoff Ryan, AQIS:

*“...One recent trend has been to modify time periods spent in PEQ and PAQ for horses that are imported under temporary conditions for competition. In all cases the protocol should specify the use of the directagen test during PAQ to provide us with some added assurance about the flue status of these horses. This should be written into the protocol, not left to the discretion of AQIS.”*

23 April 1996

Patricia M Ellis commentary on Utilisation of Modern Diagnostic Technology to Expedite International Movement of Horses circulated by Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association, USA:

*“...Sensitive diagnostic tests are extremely useful tools and any effort to increase the range of diagnostic test available should be supported. Quality control programmes are also extremely important.*

*....A test result in isolation, no matter how new the technology or rapid or sensitive the test, is only as good as the integrity of the person who collects the sample and the credibility of the certification which underpins the whole process.*

*An animal can be moved illegally without testing. If a horse is known to be positive to a disease, samples from another horse can be submitted to achieve a negative result. An entry of a test result in a passport does not guarantee a test has actually been conducted. A horse which tests negative can become infected after a test unless its status is protected by isolating it from untested animals.*

*....representatives of international horse industry groups must lobby the OIE to establish a permanent working group on the international movement of horses which can address fundamental disease control issues including updating the relevant chapters on equine diseases in the OIE International Animal Health Code....*

*Standardisation of diagnostic procedures for international trade is a responsibility of the OIE Standards Commission.....Examination of priorities and allocation of funding on an international basis would be cost effective and avoid unnecessary duplication...”*

24 August 1998

Letter from Dennis Paterson (National Manager Animal and Plant Programs Branch, AQIS) to Ms. Jan Miller President AHIC in relation to removal from a stallion from Eastern Creek to a veterinary hospital before the mandated quarantine period had expired:

*“...AQIS did not consider that the information to be gained from a Directigen flu-A assay for equine influenza warranted its application in this instance. There had been no history of contagious disease in any of the horses in this consignment since the start of PEQ in early July. Moreover, the sensitivity of Diregtigen is not particularly high and the viral antigen is only detectable for a short period of time.*

*Seven horses at RVC were considered to be at risk of exposure to airborne pathogens, by virtue of their proximity to the isolation barn to which Desert King was admitted on his arrival at RVC. These horses were separated and closely*

*monitored from 27 July until 8 August and all have remained in good health. This is a good indicator that Desert King was not shedding influenza virus while he was at RVC...*

Latest information about diagnostic technology and its usefulness in equine influenza can be obtained from the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) at Geelong. Much experience has been gained during this current EI outbreak by AAHL and other laboratories in the various jurisdictions, particularly NSW and QLD.

## **8. Quarantine and fees for shuttle stallions and other horses in quarantine**

17 August 1995

Fax and letter from Joanne Spears (President of Victorian Bloodhorse Breeders Association) to Dr. Ian Nielsen (AHC) identified:

- Lack of disease preparedness in the horse industry
- Lack of facilities for sick horses in Eastern Creek Quarantine Station (ECQS)
- Substantial levy needed on imported stallions (suggested 1.5% of fees earned or a minimum \$5000) to fund quarantine related issues
- Emphasised the potential of shutting down the horse industry due to an exotic disease outbreak

April 1999

Privatisation of animal quarantine station services AQIS Discussion Paper  
page 3

*“...where beneficiaries can be identified and have the ability to pay, it is desirable to fund the activity on a commercial basis, attracting a ‘user-pays’ fee whether undertaken by the private or public sector.*

*....The PEAQ Program operates on a full cost recovered basis, with the exception of a \$300,000 subsidy provided by the Government to assist in combating the potential smuggling of birds.....*

In this paper at page 7 of 9 there is a *Table 3: PEAQ Program Charges current at 1/1/99* in which daily fees for horses are set at \$40 for the first 25 horses and \$10 for each additional horse. This means that AQIS fees have decreased over the past 9 years, which does not make sense. Furthermore, allowing a 75% discount for horse numbers greater than 25 makes no sense at all. The cost of maintenance of physical facilities does not allow for such a reduction, nor does a reasonable rate of return on investment in infrastructure. Costs of feed and other provisions also do not seem to allow for such a steep discount in stabling fees.

5 April 2006

Letter from Kylie Lance (Manager, Live Animal Exports Program AQIS) to AHIC re fees for the export of live animals and reproductive material. Horses barely received a mention in this letter about updating AQIS fees. Of note though is the following:

*“...The live animal exports program (LAE) has a significant debt to recover, expected to be approximately \$900K by 30 June 2006. This amount has accumulated over the last 3 years and is primarily due to a reduction in export activity and a nine month delay in implementing revised fees in 2003.*

*....The AQIS Executive requires LAE to present a revised fee structure that will recover costs as well as the deficit over a two year period for implementation in June 2006.”*

## **9. Protocols for Importation and Export of Equine Semen and Embryos**

Australia has been importing and exporting horse semen since 1990. There is a very active international trade in equine semen and Australia is an active participant in all horse breeds except, for Thoroughbreds.

Applications to import horses or reproductive material into Australia can be accessed readily at:

[http://www.daff.gov.au/media/documents/aqis/importing/quarantine-material/animal\\_reproductive.pdf](http://www.daff.gov.au/media/documents/aqis/importing/quarantine-material/animal_reproductive.pdf)

Australian quarantine protocols for importation of horse reproductive material have been available for some time (for example see T94/1109 of 23 February 1996). So there is no quarantine regulatory impediment to importation or export of reproductive material from Thoroughbred horses that would preclude use of artificial breeding techniques on an international basis.

## **10. World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and international Trade**

29 February 1996

Australian Horse Council submission to the Australian Quarantine Review Committee:

*“...in international trade forums, AHC expects AQIS to pursue Australia’s right to maintain necessary and appropriate quarantine protocols particularly against the introduction of exotic diseases such as EI and CEM which are of little concern to some trading partners as they are endemic and non-notifiable in their countries.*

*The horse industry must not be “traded off” in international negotiations to gain easier market access for other agricultural animals and products.”*

## **11. Australian Quarantine Review Committee Report (The Nairn Report) “Australian Quarantine – a shared responsibility”**

29 February 1996

Australian Horse Council submission to the Australian Quarantine Review Committee raised the following issues:

*“...(AHC) endorses the international approach that quarantine import measures must be based on scientific principles but has reservations about the current feasibility of greater use of quantitative risk assessment. Agreement on a level of acceptable risk would be impossible to reach within the horse industry....*

*“.....some sectors of the horse industry.....who have no interest in international competition or trade are concerned about the pace of quarantine policy reform for import of horses. They consider that the changes benefit only a relatively small number of elite horses compared to potential exotic disease risks posed to the much larger indigenous horse population. Policy changes have been accepted by the latter group because of industry trust in the scientific expertise and operational efficiency of AQIS. More recently down-sizing and restructuring of AQIS have eroded industry confidence in the ability of AQIS to continue to manage animal quarantine policies and programs with the previous level of expertise and efficiency.*

*Conservative members of the horse industry still remember the disastrous economic impact of the previous period of marked expansion in horse imports, the 1970’s, when CEM, equine babesiosis and abortigenic equine herpesvirus 1 entered Australia.*

*Taking into consideration both views, the Australian Horse Council feels very strongly that a well staffed and well resourced quarantine service with high scientific and technical expertise must be maintained as a defence against exotic disease threats associated with expansion of international trade.*

### **4.1 Changes in operating environment since 1987**

*Detrimental change within AQIS is the area of gravest concern to AHC (see earlier) including:*

*restructuring and rationalization of quarantine service at both State and Federal level*

- *amalgamation of plant, animal and general quarantine*
- *restructuring of the animal quarantine service*
- *significant down-sizing*

- *loss or transfer of experienced, trained staff*
- *interdepartmental communication breakdowns*

*deregulation, introduction of quality assurance programs and the concept of third party service provision to off-set staff losses due to down-sizing.*

*While accepting some reform was necessary, AHC considers that the down-sizing of AQIS has gone too far at a time when expansion of trade in horses is proceeding rapidly. AHC is concerned that AQIS now lacks the resources to deliver its policies and programs with its previous efficiency.”*

#### *4.3 Risk assessment and acceptable risk*

*“...The AHC is very concerned about who would bear the costs of more complex QRA (quantitative risk assessment) procedures. With too much “quantification”, desktop analysis and endless argument, the real risk is waste of resources, resources which might be better spent on updating the scientific expertise of AQIS officers or on official inspection visits to foreign services...”*

#### *4.4 Quarantine Act (1908)*

*“...Current quarantine legislation is very old and so complex because of revisions and amendments that it is very difficult to interpret or follow. A new Act is required.*

#### *4.5 Contingency planning*

*“..Contingency planning should be part of quarantine policy framework. For instance, pro-active work should be carried out on approval of imported vaccines for use in exotic disease outbreaks.”*

#### *6. Consultative processes*

*“...Every horse owner or person who derives their income directly or indirectly from the horse industry is a stakeholder in quarantine.....”*

#### *7. Community Service Obligation (CSO)*

*Quarantine programs have a significant CSO component to protect the horse and other livestock industries, the Australian public and future generations from the economic and human health impact of exotic horse diseases.....Costs associated with development of quarantine strategies, program co-ordination and monitoring and auditing program performance should be CSOs....”*

Three Recommendations from the Nairn Report were pertinent to animal quarantine:

Recommendation 81 (page 156):

The Review Committee recommends that the animal quarantine stations operated by Quarantine Australia should be on a more commercial basis by introducing a system of forfeitable bonds for allocations of space, with bonds being forfeited if offers are not taken up within a specified period.

Recommendation 82 (page 156):

The Review Committee recommends that, in principle, Government animal quarantine stations should be offered for privatisation, subject to audit by Quarantine Australia and maintenance of appropriate security.

Recommendation 83 (page 157):

The Review Committee recommends that, in principle, private onshore high security quarantine stations should be permitted, subject to audit by Quarantine Australia and maintenance of appropriate security.

The response from the Australian Government to the Nairn Report can be accessed at:

<http://www.daff.gov.au/aqis/about/reports-pubs/nairn/govt-response>.

Interestingly, the Commonwealth Government does not appear to have addressed any of these three recommendations in its response to the Nairn Report.

## APPENDIX 1

### BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS OF BOARD MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN HORSE INDUSTRY COUNCIL INC.

**Arnott, Nina** OAM: based in SA

Director, AHIC

Executive Officer: Horse Safety Australia (industry body which provides standard operating procedures and standards for horse venues, and qualifications for instructors, event staff, clinic instructors, etc.); Workplace Trainer and Assessor, and Principal of Wirraway Training (Private Registered Training Organisation in SA which focuses on horse riding amongst other outdoor activities) Co-Manager of a youth campsite which provides horse riding for school students (3500 pa: established 1975) Co-author of equine units in the original Outdoor Recreation Industry Training Package. Member of a number of committees and working groups including: Technical Committee for national review of this Training Package; Outdoor Recreation Standing Committee of Recreation SA, Site Auditor for horse establishments for the Australian Horse Industry Council and Horse Safety Australia. Member of Horse Industry Advisory Group for SA government, and Service Skills Committee in SA. Provides advice regarding horse programs and facilities for governments, councils and individual businesses across Australia (including risk management, hazard assessment and site standard operating procedures).

Special interests: risk management, and Occupational Health and Safety in the horse industry.

**Barry, Jane**

Director, AHIC

Jane Barry has been a director of AHIC since October 2006. She is currently Executive Officer of Equine Veterinarians Australia, a Special Interest Group of the Australian Veterinary Association. Prior to this role, Jane worked as a lawyer both as legal counsel for a top ASX 30 company and in private practice for a national law firm. Her legal experience includes contract law and general commercial law.

Jane has been involved with horses all her life. She started riding at pony club and has continued her association with pony club through her daughter's involvement during the past 8 years. Jane is currently Senior Instructor at Bouddi Pony Club on the Central Coast of NSW. In addition, she breeds Welsh Section A ponies at her pony stud at Avoca and is a member of the Welsh Pony and Cob Society of Australia. Jane was previously a member of the Australian Stock Horse Society in the 1980s when her stock horse mare was a multiple Royal Show winner. She has continued her association with the ASHS through her daughter, who is now a junior member. Jane is committed to the horse industry and is passionate about its ongoing viability and success.

**Bennit, Diane**

Director, AHIC

Diane produced "Ocean Foam" who later went on to represent Australia in show jumping at the Tokyo Olympics, produced and rode the highly successful A Grade jumpers "Full Cry", "His Excellency" and "Foreign Affairs" who also competed at Advanced level in Dressage. Diane is a National Classifier and Judge for the Australian Warmblood Horse Asscn and Connemara Pony Breeders Soc of Aust.

She is a qualified coach and a trainer and assessor with the EFA, RDA, AHRC and WA Pony Club.

On the administrative side, Diane has been a delegate to the Federal EFA, EFA Grading Co-ordinator for Commentators, Chairperson of the WA Horse Council, Chair - National Coaching Accreditation Scheme WA Branch (NCAS), National Coaching Coordinator of the Australian Horse Riding Centres, Vice Chairperson of Riding for the Disabled, serves on Ring Councils for the Royal Agricultural Society, is a HorseSafe auditor and acts as an Expert Witness in equestrian cases in WA and the eastern states and is a part time Senior Lecturer at TAFE.

In 1996 Diane was the Womens Sports Foundation of WA's choice for inclusion in their book "Best 100 Women Competitors and Contributors to their Sport" and in 2007 was appointed as Stable Manager for the Australian ParaEquestrian Team that competed at the World Championships in UK

**Dagley, Ken**

Director, AHIC

**Horse Industry Leadership**

- Director – Riding for the Disabled Association Australia Ltd (RDAA)
- Director – Para Equestrian Australia Ltd
- Director - Australian Horse Industry Council (AHIC)
- National President - Australian Horse Riding Centres (AHRC)
- Team Manager – Australian Paralympic Equestrian Squad
- 

Ken is a qualified equestrian coach and trainer. He is an experienced management consultant, market researcher, training program designer and facilitator. Ken was on the Industry reference panel that designed the Queensland Government's Industry Code of Practice for Horse Riding Establishments and worked extensively on the AHIC's HorseSafe Code of Practice. He is the lead Auditor for the HorseSafe Code of Practice and conducts the Auditor accreditation course in conjunction with the Gordon Institute. He is also a member of the AHIC HorseSafe Management Committee. He lectures part-time for the University of NSW's MBA program, and has lectured part-time in Management, Service Management, and Organisation Behaviour for the School of Business RMIT University.

Ken is a Trail Ride Assessor of both the AHRC NCAS Level 1 Trail Ride Qualification and the Certificate III in Equestrian Coaching. Ken and his wife Linda previously ran the very successful Welcome Horse Riding equestrian complex at Samford Brisbane.

**Qualifications:**

Certificate of Business Administration (University of Buckingham)  
 Graduate Diploma in Organisation Change & Development (RMIT)  
 Certified Customer Service Executive - International Customer Service Association  
 Certificate III in Recreational Coaching (Equestrian)  
 AHRC NCAS Level 1 Trail Ride  
 Certificate IV in Assessing and Workplace Training  
 Qualified HorseSafe Auditor

**Davenport, Paul**

Director, AHIC

Paul has been professionally instructing and assessing in the Horse Industry for 29 years, in which time he established riding programs (arena instruction, trail riding for day, overnight and wilderness rides), training programs and coached and competed at elite levels;

Paul is currently the Vice President of the Australian Horse Industry Council (AHIC) and the current President of The Association for Horsemanship, Safety & Education (AHSE) Paul was a member of the AHIC Code of Practise Review Group. He delivered the AHIC HorseSafe Risk Management Workshops across Australia and has completed the AHIC Auditors Course. Paul is also a qualified Clinic Instructor with the AHSE; and has qualifications with the CHA (USA, Canada) and AQHA & HSAA (Judging).

Paul has a business background at a senior management level. He was the Business Development Manager for Contingency Management Pty Ltd and Business Development and Marketing Manager for Federation Health Pty Ltd before setting up his own consulting company for businesses involved in adventure and horse related activities; providing assistance in risk and emergency management planning.

Paul is currently the Manager, Risk Services for Affinity Risk Partners.

**Hoare, Rod**

Director, AHIC

Rod Hoare has ridden and owned horses since he was 12 years old. He competed at his first One Day Events while a member of Avondale Pony Club. He graduated from Veterinary Science at Sydney University in

1967. His four children competed at shows and attended Berrima District Pony Club. Rod was an Instructor and later President of BDPC. Not content to let the children have all the fun, Rod bought a truck and went back to competing at Eventing. He achieved his goal of completing a Three Day Event before he turned 50. Rod was on the Committee of The NSW Branch of the [EFA](#) and a delegate to [NSW Eventing](#) for many years and was the driving force behind St Gregory's One Day Event.

Rod was Quarantine Manager for SOCOG at the Sydney Olympics and the State Equine Veterinary Officer for NSW Agriculture. He has now retired to his farm where he and his partner, Helena Warren, are breeding Murray Grey cattle plus a few horses. Rod is still involved with local horse organisations - the Crookwell Equestrian Club, Crookwell Show Society and Binda Picnic races.

### **O'Callaghan, Paul**

Director, AHIC

Paul grew up in Melbourne and after a farm holiday at 12 years of age developed a passion for horses and riding. Living in the city gave him little opportunity to indulge this passion however exposure to horses and riding did lead him to pursue a career as a veterinarian.

After three years of veterinary school he took a break from study to spend a year in NSW working on a cattle stud. This involved a lot of work on horseback. Although the work was hard he had one of the best years of his life. While there he bought his first horse for \$400. (On the same day he bought his first car also for \$400.)

Besides one Hunter Trial Paul has not engaged in competitive horse events but one way or another he have been involved in nearly all equestrian sports. Paul has particularly enjoyed riding young and problem horses, although not always to his benefit or wellbeing. In more recent times his riding activities have been limited due to injuries from both riding and football. Nevertheless when he has time he enjoys nothing more than spending a day on a horse with friends in country Victoria.

Since graduating as a veterinarian he has worked with horses widely throughout Australia and the world. Paul had the good fortune to be employed in leading equine practices in Victoria, Sydney and England as well as a brief stint in Zimbabwe. He also spent three and a half years as an equine veterinarian in Saudi Arabia working for the Crown Prince. Currently Paul is employed by Racing Victoria as an industry veterinary surgeon. He is responsible for management of the quarantine station at Sandown racecourse near Melbourne.

Paul has been a director of the Australian Horse Industry Council since 1998 as the designated representative of the Australian Racing Board. During this time he has been exposed to other livestock industry organisations and all levels of government. It has become increasingly obvious that an effective peak body is vital to achieving maximum prosperity for all involved in both the pleasure and

professional sections of the horse industry. One of Paul's visions for the Australian Horse Industry is that there will be greater interaction between various industry groups. This may lead to greater participation in horse sports by all Australians which will be good for horses and for Australians.

**Ritchie, Gail**

Director AHIC

My background in the equine industry contains a lifetime of experience as I am the daughter of a professional horse trainer and breeder. As a stud breeder, competitor, judge and instructor I have experienced all practical levels of the equine industry. I have also been involved in the importation of horses, operated horse auctions, public and private, managed some of Australia's largest equine events and served on many association boards. I have managed equine commercial trail riding and boarding operations along with being employed as the general manager of the National Cutting Horse Association over a 5 year period and worked for the Australian Quarter Horse Association in the Show and Performance section.

Currently I am employed as the Equine Project Officer by the Tamworth Regional Council for the development of the Australian Equine and Livestock Centre which is being funded by the Commonwealth, State and Local Governments. I am a member of the AAWS working group for animals used for work, sport, recreation and display and have been a director of the AHIC for over 6 years.

**Smyth, Barry**

Director, AHIC

Dr. Barry Smyth is an equine veterinarian of 35 years experience. He is a registered specialist equine surgeon and qualified company director. He has worked in many overseas countries and 3 Australian states. He is immediate past President of Equine Veterinarians Australia, a director of the Australian Veterinary Association Ltd, and of the Australian Horse Industry Council Inc. He represents the horse industry at Animal Health Australia, the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease, and the National Emergency Animal Disease Management Group.

As a private veterinary practitioner he attended horses at the Sandown quarantine station for many years.

**Walker, Rex**

Director, AHIC

I was raised in a small town on the Murray River where my first job was milking cows and delivering milk (bucket and ladle job). Unfortunately, my education

was cut short by a serious illness. My first love was sailing and messing about in boats, this started on the Murray as a kid with a home made raft.

My career led me into work with a multinational company where I wound up working 12 to 16 hours a day seven-day weeks for months on end. Not much time for anything else. This also gave me the opportunity to move to Queensland where I eventually purchased a small farm. So what is a cattleman without a horse. I learnt to ride and chase cattle.

My girls learnt to ride and joined the local pony club. I became President of the pony club. I became involved in breeding and showing Arabians and Arabian Ponies. This was an all-consuming passion until old injuries caught up and pain etc prevented riding and running. A friend, the best carriage driver I have met, offered to teach me to drive. This was great, I still had horses and ponies and I could still do something with them. I learnt to drive all the combinations, single, pairs, tandem and teams. For many years I competed with a tandem of ponies, now sadly gone on.

I have been involved in the administration of breed societies and clubs for most of the time. I am founding president of the Coach and Carriage Driving Promotions Association Inc and a committee member of the Queensland Carriage Driving Society Inc. I am also a National Assessor and Life Member of RDAQ(Driving). This all led to an association with and membership of the Queensland Horse Industry Council for the last ten years or so.

### **Ellis, Patricia**

Convenor, AHIC Health and Quarantine Committee

#### **Qualifications**

- BVSc First Class Hons (1968) University of Melbourne
- MVSc (1973) University of Melbourne
- Australian College of Veterinary Scientists
  - Membership by Examination in Equine Medicine (1988)
  - Membership by Examination in Epidemiology (1997)

Dr Patricia Ellis, the Convener of the Australian Horse Industry Council Quarantine and Heath Committee, has a global perspective and broad experience in the horse industry. She is a Past-President of the Australian Equine Veterinary Association and was a member of the Quarantine Advisory Committee for horse events at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.

She has been associated with importation of horses to Australia in a variety of roles, on and off shore, since 1976, both as a private practitioner and government official. She also has a personal interest in horses as an owner, breeder, competitor and judge.

Dr Ellis spent the early years of her career in research and teaching followed by horse practice in Australia, Newmarket and Epsom in England, the Curragh in Ireland and in Bahrain in the Middle East.

Between 1989 and 1993, Dr Ellis was employed by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service in Victoria as a Senior Veterinary Officer. During this time she was involved in supervision of Spotswood Quarantine Station and development and implementation of horse quarantine protocols to facilitate safe international movement, working on projects such as the 1996 Melbourne Olympic Bid; the opening of the "Kangaroo" air-route to Australia through the Middle East and Asia; movement of horses to and from Japan and, the internationalization of the Melbourne Cup.

Subsequently, she served as Director of the Veterinary Department of the United Arab Emirates Equestrian and Racing Federation and was part of the team that developed horse quarantine infrastructure, a prerequisite to the conduct of the international Dubai World Cup race meeting.

Between 1996 and April 2002, Dr Ellis was employed as Principal Veterinary Officer, Horse Industry Programs with the (then) Department of Natural Resources and Environment in Victoria. The position had a policy development focus and was based within the Unit of the Chief Veterinary Officer of Victoria. During this period she made a significant and influential national contribution to the development of equine health programs and acted from time to time as the Chief Veterinary Officer of Victoria.

She currently works as an Animal Health Consultant in the private sector and is involved in a variety of projects relating to international movement of horses and contingency planning for emergency horse diseases. She has also been directly involved in the operation of Racing Victoria's quarantine facilities at Sandown Racecourse for the past 11 years.